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  1 
Overview 
59% of people consult friends for advice in making purchase decisions1. Not surprisingly, 
concomitant with the exploding growth of digital social networks, firms recognize the 
importance of using referral programs towards driving new business. Such schemes 
encourage existing customers with an incentive-laden call-to-action to engage their social 
networks by informing them about products and ultimately influencing and stimulating 
friends’ purchase decisions. While referral marketing is a widely-adopted practice, the 
underlying science behind understanding and optimizing its various dimensions is 
nascent. The optimal design of referral program can be determined by three key design 
choices: incentive design (for both sender and recipients), call-to-action for information 
sharing (from the company to the sender) and message design (from the sender to the 
recipient). While previous research has examined the design of message sent from the 
senders to the recipients (Sun et al. 2014), no study has investigated how firms can 
optimally design the referral incentive and call-to-action message to engage customers. 
Given the increasing importance of online referral programs, it is crucial to close this gap. 
 Along with that, the massive growth in online social networking has revitalized 
academic interest in the power of social contagion as a force for individual and collective 
action. By conducting large-scale randomized field experiments (Aral and Walker 2011b, 
Bapna and Umyarov 2016), past studies causally identified peer effects in online social 
networks. Having established the causal existence of peer effects, it becomes natural to 
evolve towards asking how can we create, perhaps even maximize, social contagion by 
optimizing the various dimensions of the referral program. The broad goal of my 
                                                 
1 Source: blog.talkable.com 
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dissertation is to study this issue. This dissertation examines two key design choices of a 
referral program. Specifically, it examines whether and how a firm can enhance the 
effectiveness of the referral program and increase social contagion by varying incentives 
shared by customers with their friends (Essay 1) as well as varying the framing of the 
call-to-action messages sent from the company to the customers (Essay 2).  
 The experimental design in both essays is motivated by the seminal research in 
economics that categorizes individuals into three categories based on their self and other 
regarding preferences (Andreoni and Miller 2002). Andreoni and Miller (2002) showed 
that individuals are either purely self-regarding, or they care about others, but not more 
than they care about themselves, or their preferences are substitutable between 
themselves and others. In line with this study, I designed the experiments to study which 
of the three key referral reward structures and three different framings of call-to-action 
maximize WOM-based adoption.  
 In the first essay, I focus on using economic incentives to maximize word-of-mouth 
as a mechanism for spreading awareness and adoption of a product. The broad category 
of economic incentives I use fall under the label of what are called referral rewards. A 
firm typically provides incentives to existing customers to bring in new customers. Such 
rewards can be monetary or cosmetic (e.g., status, badges) incentives to existing users for 
engaging in word-of-mouth, thereby increasing adoption of the product among their 
friends.  
 In practice, companies use different incentive structures when running a referral 
program. For example, some companies design incentive scheme so that the entire 
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incentive can be given to the sender, whereas other design incentive scheme so that 
incentives can be split proportionally between the sender and the recipient, or can be 
rewarded entirely to a recipient as an altruistic gesture to encourage participation. 
However, although these schemes are being widely used in practice, their efficacy still 
remains an open question. Therefore, there is a need to understand which of these 
incentive structures is most effective in maximizing the diffusion of the product. 
 The experiment design involves manipulations of how the monetary reward is 
shared between the sender and the recipient of the referral: selfish reward (sender gets all 
or vast majority of the reward), equal reward (50-50 split), and generous reward 
(recipient gets all or vast majority of the reward). In the essay, I present evidence from 
two experiment studies that improve the understanding of different aspects of designing 
referral programs. Study 1’s primary contribution is helping us understand these tradeoffs 
in the spread of offline word-of-mouth in a field based mobile social gaming context. 
Study 2 was designed to better understand the underlying mechanisms, as I was unable to 
track the users fully through the referral process in the first experiment.  
 Overall, the results of the two studies allow me to understand the tradeoff between 
incentivizing the sender and receiver in designing referral marketing programs. Study 1 
points unambiguously towards the importance of a significant pro-social split in the 
incentives with a significant share for the recipient to increase offline word-of-mouth 
based diffusion. Study 2 takes place in a non-social context where I can observe the effect 
of treatments towards the sending rates of the referrals as well as record recipients’ 
actions without the need for self-reporting. In study 2, I observe no significant difference 
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across the incentive splits with regard to the overall number of new adopters. However, 
the results offer some interesting mechanism level insights into the inherent tradeoff 
between incentivizing the sender and the receiver. At the mechanism level, in contrast to 
ex ante expectations of rational utility maximizing agents, I find no significant difference 
in the three incentive schemes with respect to the rate of sending out referrals. This 
reveals that agents’ utility is composed of both self-maximizing components and 
altruistic components in equal parts. The pro-social schemes, conditional on receiving a 
referral, have better conversion rates. This is confirmed by examining the recipient’s 
decision to adopt the new game as a function of the sender’s treatment group. The 
recipient’s acceptance of the referral is highest in the generous scheme suggesting that 
firms can sacrifice some of the rewards to the sender without fear of cannibalization of 
the sender’s actions. Together, the findings in the first essay suggest that a budget-
constrained marketer should lean towards using referral incentive schemes that have a 
significant pro-social component in them in order to promote viral adoption in the digital 
world. 
 In the second essay, I study how firms can optimally design a call-to-action 
message to encourage existing customers to make online referrals, given a fixed incentive 
scheme. Past literatures on referral marketing show that what the receiver knows about 
the sender matters. For example, Sun et al. (2014) have found that simply adding 
information about the sender’s purchase increases recipient’s likelihood of purchase. 
However, no study has investigated how firms can optimally design the call-to-action to 
engage customers in initiating referrals in the first place. This essay is among the first to 
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tackle the optimal design of the call-to-action question.  
 A close look at influential referral programs in the practice reveals that there are 
three types of call-to-action for sharing to the customer who may initiate referrals (i.e. 
‘sender’): a) the ‘egoistic’ call-to-action, where the firms highlight the reward to the 
sender, b) the ‘equitable’ call-to-action, where the firms highlight that both sender and 
her friends can get the reward, and c) the ‘altruistic’ call-to-action, where the firms 
highlight the reward to the friends. Among all three types of call-to-action for a referral, 
the ‘altruistic’ call is least observed, potentially driven by firms’ perception that the 
sender may be more likely to initiate a referral if her own, ostensibly monetary, benefit is 
highlighted.  
 However, previous literature has shown that individuals may derive significant non-
monetary payoff from helping others in the form of either warm glow or pure altruism. 
Thus, the altruistic call may enhance customers’ pure altruism or warm glow therefore 
encourage more sharing from them. In addition, the altruistic call may reduce customers’ 
psychological cost of feeling guilty about gaining referral rewards (Rue and Feick 2007). 
Given above considerations, I posit, and causally demonstrate, via a large scale 
randomized field experiment involving 100,000 customers, that altruism plays a key role 
in activating the ideal form of product advocacy from those initiating referrals. When 
contrasted with egoistic and equitable framing of calls-to-action, the altruistic framing 
yields a significantly higher propensity to initiate a referral as well as a significantly 
higher number of successful referrals. The effects are economically significant - altruistic 
framing yields 99% and 30% higher total number of referrals than egoistic framing and 
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equitable framing respectively, the latter two being statistically indistinguishable from the 
control group. Further, altruistic framing yields 425% and 135% levels of recipients’ 
purchases compared to egoistic framing and equitable framing respectively. The yields 
associated with egoistic and equitable framing are again statistically indistinguishable 
from the control group. Additional mechanism level analysis that interacts the treatments 
with customer characteristics such as repeat purchase, net promoter score, and time since 
last purchase, and a post-experiment survey, confirm my hypotheses about the 
importance of an altruistic element in generating a higher quality of advocacy and 
reducing referral frictions. The altruistic group, positively interacts with customer affinity 
variables such as repeat purchases indicator, net promoter score and positively interacts 
with the recency of purchase. Further, subjects in the altruistic group report lower levels 
of guilt associated with sending a referral and are more readily able to identify friends 
and family who might benefit from the product. Together, this results in higher quality of 
advocacy which explains the robust (to multiple econometric specifications) findings on 
the benefits of altruistic call-to-action for online referrals. 
 This dissertation offers several contributions to several streams of prior research. 
First, the study enriches the literature on digital word-of-mouth by identifying the causal 
effect of incentive structure and call-to-action design – two key elements in designing 
referral programs. Although, designing key elements of an online referral program to 
drives social contagion has been of much interest to both academics and practitioners, 
identifying the causal effects of different design are methodologically hard because of 
endogeneity (Manski 1993). Using a large scale randomized experiment, I show that pro-
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social incentive structure and altruistic framing work best in driving referrals and related 
outcomes. Second, this essay also closes the gap of identifying the optimal design of 
online referral program.  Existing studies of designing referral programs on WOM mainly 
focused on senders’ behavior and rarely considered incentive sharing schemes or 
different message design. I contribute to the literature by studying how firms can 
optimally design the incentive and message to the sender (call-to-action) to engage 
customers. Finally, my study is also among the first to show that altruism is an important 
driver of information sharing among customers and how such motive leads to sharing 
decision and sharing outcomes. Specifically, the study provides concrete and causal 
support to the hitherto under-studied role of altruism in creating word-of-mouth. In the IS 
literature, a few studies have analyzed motives of online behaviors such as community 
participation and found that they are likely to be driven by altruism (Bitzer et al. 2007, 
Anderson and Agarwal 2011, Jabr et al. 2014, Xia, Huang, Duan, and Whinston 2012). 
However, despite the large volume of online referrals, little is understood about its 
underlying motives, as well as how companies can leverage such motives. This 
dissertation, taking advantage of a randomized field experiment, and including a detailed 
analysis over multiple moderators and a large-scale survey, presents strong and consistent 
evidence that altruism is crucial in driving referrals. This work also provides clear 
guidance on how firms can leverage altruism to improve referral behavior and outcomes. 
 As firms heavily rely on referral marketing, understanding how incentive structure 
and call-to-action messages causally impacts the diffusion of products through WOM is a 
crucial step in developing referral program strategies for increasing adoption of products. 
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I believe this dissertation enriches the literature by providing empirical analysis of 
different referral reward schemes and messages, as well as provide great implications to 
companies seeking to maximize returns from information sharing by providing 
information about the optimal design choices. 
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Essay 1: Examining the Impact of Incentive Structure on Referral 
Program Design 
 
1. Introduction 
The massive growth in online social networking has revitalized academic interest in the 
power of social contagion as a force for individual and collective action. Of particular 
interest is the recent move towards large-scale in-vivo randomized field experiments to 
causally identify peer effects (Aral and Walker 2011B, Bapna and Umyarov 2016) in 
online social networks, a significant scientific challenge with purely observational data.  
This new wave of literature gives us confidence that peer-effects are ‘at-work’ in the 
general population of users in online social networks. Having established the causal 
existence of peer effects, it becomes natural to evolve towards asking how can I create, 
perhaps even maximize, social contagion using specific mechanisms that may be at work 
in creating social contagion. This is the focus of the first essay. In particular, I focus on 
using economic incentives to maximize referral based awareness and adoption of a 
product. Note that while peer influence works through a variety of mechanisms such as 
imitation, status seeking, creating awareness, explicit or tacit persuasion, observational or 
social learning (Aral 2011), I focus on friends inviting friends through word-of-mouth 
because it is an important, possibly dominant2, social contagion mechanism. In terms of 
offline word-of-mouth, it has the additional challenge that it has traditionally been hard to 
                                                 
2 For instance, industry reports suggest that face to face invites have 5x the acceptance rate of Facebook 
invites as per http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/newswire/2009/global-advertising-consumers-trust-real-
friends-and-virtual-strangers-the-most.html    
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measure, as it does not lend itself to digitization. I will detail how I overcome this 
challenge when I present the institutional context in this essay. 
The broad category of economic incentives I use fall under the label of what are 
called referral rewards. A firm typically invites an existing customer to refer and bring in 
another customer and offers a reward to the existing customer. Such rewards can be 
monetary or cosmetic (e.g., status, badges) incentives to existing users for engaging in 
word-of-mouth, thereby increasing adoption of the product among their friends. For 
instance, Dropbox provides extra 500MB of space to the user per referral once a user 
refers new customers3. Groupon also offers a user $10 Groupon Bucks4, which can be 
used toward any purchase on the website, when a user refers a new customer and that 
new user makes a first purchase of $10 or more within certain number of hours. On the 
other hand, companies like Lyft, which facilitates peer-to-peer ridesharing by connecting 
passengers to drivers using a mobile-phone application, have tried referral schemes in 
which both a new customer and her referrer got $5 each5. In contrast, Blue Apron, an 
online meal subscription service, has a different referral reward strategy that allows its 
existing users to send a free box of gourmet food to a friend, who is not yet a user of the 
service6. But although these schemes are being widely used in practice, their efficacy still 
remains an open question. Scott Cook, CEO of Intuit, while speaking on their ad-hoc 
approach to designing referral reward schemes said: 
                                                 
3 https://www.dropbox.com/referrals 
4 http://www.groupon.com/referral 
5 https://www.lyft.com/help/article/1455280 
6 https://awesomesauceeats.wordpress.com/tag/blue-apron/ 
  11 
“…We’ve tried various artificial stimulants to word of mouth, like 
financial incentives to recommenders. None have worked. Some produced 
isolated, but surprising, negative reaction: ‘I don’t sell my friends for a bit of 
cash’7…” 
 This begs the design of a systematic study of effectiveness of these different 
incentive schemes on spreading word-of-mouth. Therefore, in this essay, I explore this 
research question using a two study design that sheds light on different aspects of offline 
and online word-of-mouth. In Study 1, I deploy a field experiment set in the context of a 
mobile social gaming application, where the goal of the participants is to spread the 
adoption of the mobile gaming app. The context of social gaming is important and 
interesting especially given the growth of a new digital economy that is built around 
enabling users to have a shared experience. Study 2 was designed to better understand the 
underlying mechanisms, as I am unable to track the users fully through the referral 
process in the mobile environment. It is a more controlled experiment with student 
subjects where the goal is to spread the adoption of a web-based word game and the 
entire referral process takes place via my custom online platform that allows for 
extensive tracking of the actions of senders and receivers of the referral incentives.  
The research design involves manipulations of how the monetary reward is shared 
between the sender and the recipient of the referral. In particular, I aim to investigate the 
tradeoffs between incentivizing the sender of the referral and the recipient of the referral. 
It is obvious to state that successful referrals are contingent on positive actions from both 
                                                 
7 Rosen 2009, The Anatomy of Buzz Revisited: Real-life lessons in Word-of-Mouth Marketing, Crown 
Business. 
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the sender and the receiver.  The research design is motivated by multiple theories from 
economics and sociology. The initial motivation of the study comes from seminal 
research in economics that categorizes individuals into three categories based on their self 
and other regarding preferences (Andreoni and Miller 2002). In the study, the authors 
showed that individuals are either purely self-regarding, or they care about others but not 
more than they care about themselves, or their preferences are substitutable between 
themselves and others. In line with this finding of Andreoni and Miller (2002), I test three 
different incentive schemes: a) the ‘selfish’ reward scheme, where the sender gets the 
reward, b) the ‘split’ reward scheme, where the sender and the recipient split the reward 
equally, and c) the ‘generous’ reward scheme, where the entire reward is given to the 
recipient. The research question asks which of these reward schemes is the most effective 
in stimulating social contagion through WOM-based adoption.   
Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus emerging from the prior literature 
regarding this question. Rational choice theory dictates that referral rewards to sender 
will motivate them to invite others, while equity theory encourages an even split in the 
reward between the sender and the recipient in order to address their sense of equity and 
fairness. More recent work from Dunn and Norton (2013), however, argues that 
individuals are happier when they can be pro-social by acting generously, which 
motivates rewarding the recipient only. 
Evaluating such effects of different referral reward schemes on WOM have been 
difficult so far because peer effects and WOM are typically endogenous (Manski 1993, 
Van den Bulte and Iyengar 2011) and especially for offline WOM, the effects are 
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difficult to trace or measure. But online and mobile environments of today give richer 
data and attribution ability that can potentially be useful to overcome the measurement 
problem. Additionally, the design of the randomized experiment with different reward 
structure allows for causal interpretation of the treatment effects (Aral 2011). The use of 
a randomized field experiment is to overcome myriad sources of endogeneity that would 
plague pseudo-treatment effects from observational data based studies of effectiveness of 
referral incentive schemes. Depending on how companies run the different incentive 
schemes, these include, but are not limited to a) potential omitted variable bias stemming 
from unobserved consumer characteristics that could be correlated to different treatment 
types and outcomes, b) selection bias if companies were targeting certain types of users 
with certain schemes, and c) reverse causality even if more active referring was linked 
with higher rewards.  
This essay complements two streams of prior research on IS and marketing: 
estimating causal peer influence in networks, and constructing referral incentive schemes 
to promote WOM based adoption. While there have been recent studies estimating causal 
peer influence in networks (Aral and Walker 2011B, Bapna and Umyarov 2016), as well 
as analytical and experimental studies in optimal referral literature and WOM (Kornish 
and Li 2010, Wirtz and Chew 2002, Ryu and Feick 2007), there has been relatively less 
work on how to use viral incentives to create contagion. 
The main finding from the two experimental studies in this essay suggest that a 
budget-constrained marketer should lean towards using referral incentive schemes that 
have a significant pro-social component in them in order to promote viral adoption in the 
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digital world. The key result from Study 1 that the generous treatment maximizes induced 
adoptions adds to the body of evidence against the purely rational theories of self-
maximizing economic agents. Study 2 helps us understand some of the underlying 
mechanisms. One of the interesting results emerges from examining the effect of 
treatments on the senders’ decision to initiate referrals. The fact that this does not 
significantly decay as more money is taken away from the sender and given to the 
recipient reveals that the sender’s utility is made up, equally, of a self-interested 
component and an altruistic component. 
It is important to note that the context matters. There are important differences in 
the overall results from the two studies that have related but different context. I would be 
cautious in generalizing the claims beyond the two particular context and call for 
additional future research using designs similar to the one proposed in this study. 
Specifically, future research should cull out the linkage between the three incentive 
schemes and the underlying motives behind the senders’ and recipient’s actions in the 
context of referral marketing.   
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Social Contagion 
Causal identification of how peer effects drive social contagion in the general population 
of users in online social networks has been of much interest to both academics and 
practitioners. But identifying social contagion effects are methodologically hard because 
user characteristics and behavior tend to cluster in online social network (Aral and 
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Walker 2011b). However, randomization is an effective method for identifying social 
effects from homophily mechanisms and other confounders, and can help in clearly 
estimating causal peer influence in networks. Recent research efforts have therefore 
focused on overcoming the challenges of analyzing purely observational data by using 
large-scale in-vivo randomized field experiments to causally identify the presence of peer 
effects (Aral and Walker 2011b, Bapna and Umyarov 2016) in online social networks. 
Aral and Walker (2011a) focus on studying the effectiveness of different viral product 
design features in creating peer influence and social contagion in new product diffusion 
by conducting a randomized block design field experiment on users of Facebook. Bapna 
and Umyarov (2016) conduct a randomized field experiment in the context of a freemium 
social network to find the causal relationship of peer effect on premium subscriptions. 
They distribute a premium subscription gift to randomly selected users, which work as an 
exogenous random assignment of a treatment to a subset of the population, and observe 
whether being connected to the users that received the premium service increases the 
likelihood of acquiring this service.  
Although these previous works have established the causal existence of peer 
effects, empirical evidence of what mechanisms drive behavioral contagions in social 
networks and how we can promote such contagion is still somewhat lacking 
(Sundararajan et al. 2013). Aral (2011) suggested that social contagion may be driven by 
a combination of different kinds of possible mechanisms such as awareness raising, 
explicit or tacit persuasion, observational or social learning or imitation among others. 
Another important, and possibly dominant, mode of social contagion mechanism is the 
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word-of-mouth (WOM). Individuals can exercise peer effect by sharing their overall 
experience and satisfaction level of the product. This WOM can change peers’ 
understanding of the product as well as peers’ expectations of utility function in two 
ways. Peers might change their behavior because they become aware of the existence of 
the product or be persuaded of the benefits of the product they already know (Aral 2011). 
However, traditionally it has been hard to measure offline WOM as it does not lend itself 
well to digitization. Study 1 of this paper adds to the literature on social contagion by 
focusing on offline word-of-mouth as a mechanism for spreading awareness about a new 
product, and exploring how it can be stimulated by the design of economic incentives. 
2.2 WOM and Incentive Design 
Several studies have recognized the importance of carefully managing referral programs 
to stimulate word-of-mouth. Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) develop an analytical model in 
which a customer’s delight level with the product causes referrals, and identified 
conditions under which referral reward is more effective than price reduction in 
enhancing a firm’s profitability. Based on the idea of social motives, Kornish and Li 
(2010) establish a compensatory model in which senders explicitly care about their 
friends’ satisfaction with their recommendations rather than their own delight with the 
product. Wirtz and Chew (2002) and Ryu and Feick (2007) investigate the effectiveness 
of referral bonuses in experimental settings. Wirtz and Chew (2002) examine the role of 
incentive, deal proneness, satisfaction, and tie strength on WOM. Ryu and Feick (2007) 
study the relationship between referral rewards and tie strength. They find that rewards 
are particularly effective in increasing referral, especially for weak ties and weaker 
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brands. Although these studies examine the effect of referral incentive design on WOM, a 
key limitation has been that these were conducted purely in a lab environment. To the 
best of my knowledge, this work is the first study that combines insights from a field and 
lab experiment on the impact of incentive design on the adoption of a digital good. This 
complements prior work by analyzing the behaviors of real users in reaction to various 
referral incentive schemes using a randomized field experiment. 
2.3 User Behaviors and Incentive Design 
The incentive structure of customer referral programs determines how the reward is 
divided between the sender who makes a referral and a recipient (new customer) who 
accepts it. Recent studies from behavioral economists suggest that this division of 
incentive can greatly influence the outcome of the referral program because senders 
exhibit three types of behavior: generosity, equity seeking, or selfishness. In an 
experiment setting, Andreoni and Miller (2002) show that while only quarter of subjects 
reveal selfish behavior, the rest of subjects exhibit a significant degree of rationally 
altruistic behavior. Moreover, they demonstrate that almost half of the participants’ 
behavior was consistent with one of the 3 CES utility functions: perfectly selfish, perfect 
substitutes, or Leontief. Those with Leontief preferences always divided the surplus 
equally while those with perfect substitute preferences either act generously or selfishly 
depending on the price of giving. This observation provides the theoretical foundation for 
my experiment design in which I have explored these three reward-referral mechanisms: 
selfish reward (sender gets the whole reward), equal reward (the reward is split equally 
between the sender and recipient), and generous reward (recipient gets the whole reward).  
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However, there is no clear consensus emerging from the prior literature regarding 
which of these incentives schemes would maximize adoption of the product through 
referrals. Dunn and Norton’s research on pro-social happiness effect dictates that people 
are happier when they spend money on others (Dunn and Norton 2013), which implies 
that referral reward programs may benefit from tapping into the pro-social, “generous”, 
guilt-free incentive condition by giving the entire reward to the recipient. Equity theory 
says that individuals seek equity and fairness in what they give and receive from others 
(Walster et al. 1973), which suggests that a split condition that gives “equal” rewards to 
the sender and recipient may be an effective referral mechanism. Lastly, rational choice 
theory denotes that the reward should be given to a sender in order to kick-start this 
referral process. That is, by tapping into the “selfish”, reward-seeking behavior of users, 
marketers can mobilize them to refer and recruit more friends to adopt the product. 
Aherns et al. (2013) conduct a field experiment in an online shopping mall with e-
referrals and find that inequity between the sender and recipient’s reward amount favors 
the sender to enhance WOM.  
On the other hand, some theories predict that providing incentive can prevent 
referrals. For example, metaperception theory denotes that giving incentive can prevent 
referrals when the incentive for referral is rewarded only to the sender. Metaperception 
refers to the process by which people decide based on what others may think of them or 
their behaviors (Laing et al. 1966). According to metaperception theory, in a non-
incentivized WOM setting, senders will perceive themselves as performing a good action 
and believe that the recipients too would judge it that way. However, in an incentivized 
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referral situation in which a referral is rewarded only to the sender, a sender may think 
that the recipient will perceive this referral as being driven by a desire to get the reward 
rather than an intrinsic motivation of inviting a friend (Wirtz et al. 2012). In this case the 
probability of referral will likely decrease.  
It is difficult to reconcile all these differing viewpoints regarding the efficacy of 
the different incentive schemes in the absence of a robust randomized experimental 
design. In this essay, I conduct a randomized field experiment to address this issue, 
namely, how to structure such incentives (i.e., divide it between the sender and the 
recipient) to increase adoption of digital goods, in this case – a mobile social game app in 
study 1 and a non-social online word game in Study 2, through referrals. This essay 
enriches the literature on viral incentive design by providing empirical analysis of these 
different referral reward schemes, and presents a first step in the effort towards deriving 
greater consensus on this topic. 
3. Field Experiment Based Study 1 
3.1 Institutional Details: Mobile Social Games 
For Study 1, I partnered with a company that specializes in developing social gaming 
applications to compare the effectiveness of the three referral reward structures in 
stimulating adoption of their new game through offline WOM. This company is of 
particular interest because its products are digital versions of popular board games, which 
therefore feature two important directions in which the digital goods have been evolving 
– mobile and social. The widespread adoption of mobile devices like smartphones and 
tablets has led to a burgeoning market for mobile applications, in particular, gaming 
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applications like the one used in this experiment. Popular multiplayer social gaming 
applications similar to the app used in this study include Draw Something, Words With 
Friends, Heads Up, and Evil Apples.  
The mobile gaming market is one of the fastest growing segments in today’s 
digital market. In 2013, out of the $75.5B gaming industry, mobile phone gaming 
accounted for $17.6 B with about 1.11 B gamers. By 2017, the mobile gaming market is 
expected to reach $35.4 B in revenues and attain 34% share of the gaming market8. The 
aspect of social interactions embedded in the design of these games is also a reason for 
their growing popularity. These games are even becoming a fun-filled way of providing 
training, teaching social skills, encouraging collaboration, and devising strategy. As the 
mobile gaming market continues to grow, the particular context of this study itself 
becomes an important market to investigate the question of how to structure the referral 
rewards to generate adoption of games through WOM.  
The mobile game developing company I partnered with has created a social game 
that is intended to be a party game, one that is played in a communal environment9. So all 
the players have to be co-located when they play the game. The application is a multi-
player game in which each player takes turn to ask funny questions from a pack of 
content cards and other players get to choose answers from a set of preloaded options, 
and earn points for best answers. Sample screenshots from the game are shown in Figure 
1. In addition to content cards, the game also has a number of cosmetic features to 
enhance interaction among players (e.g., screen avatars, like and dislike options). The 
                                                 
8 http://www.newzoo.com/insights/global-games-market-will-reach-102-9-billion-2017-2/ 
9 This social app needs at least three co-located players to play a round of the game. 
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game was released on both Android and iOS app stores for free. The company monetizes 
through in-app purchase of additional packs of content cards and various cosmetic 
features.  
 
 
Figure 1: Screenshots of the Mobile Game App 
Because the game can only be played among co-located players, users who 
discover and directly download the game from the app store (i.e., organic users) have to 
invite their friends to play the game with. Therefore, offline WOM, such as, face-to-face 
invitations to join the game is a key mechanism that drives the adoption of this product. 
The app uses a geo-sensing feature to add co-located players10 to the game and to help 
new players explicitly identify their senders. The screen to attribute an invitation pops up 
at the beginning of the first game played by a user if this user’s account was created 
within the last hour and this user has never played the game before. The invitation 
attribution screen is dynamically populated with a list of co-located users with whom this 
new user can play the first game and from which he/she can select the sender. 
                                                 
10 As far as the geo-sensing feature is concerned, co-located users can be within 1 degree of latitude and 
longitude of each other. But only users that are actually physically co-located can play this game together 
because it requires verbal interaction. 
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Conversely, a user is classified as an organic user (i.e., who likely discovered the app on 
their own), and hence, do not see the invite attribution screen, if they do not play their 
first game within an hour of downloading the app 11 . The reason - based on the 
conversations with the CEO of the gaming company - is that it is unlikely that an organic 
user will manage to find or convince at least two other users to download, install, sign up, 
and play the first game all within an hour12. 
3.2. Study 1 - Experimental Design 
The experimental design of this essay is motivated by the work of Andreoni and Miller 
(2002) which categorizes individuals into three categories based on their self and other 
regarding preferences. They showed that individuals are either purely self-regarding, or 
they care about others, but not more than they care about themselves, or their preferences 
are substitutable between themselves and others. Therefore, I designed the randomized 
field experiment to study which of the three key referral reward structures, namely, 
selfish (sender gets the entire incentive), equal sharing (incentive is equally divided), and 
pro-social (recipient gets the entire incentive), maximizes WOM-based adoption. 
Since I partnered with the mobile social gaming company before the release of 
this app, I was able to record data about two types of users in the trial – “existing users,” 
                                                 
11 A potential misclassification of an invited user as an organic user may happen in the unlikely event 
where the invited user is instructed to download the app in advance in anticipation of playing the game later 
on. If the duration between the app download and the first game is more than an hour, then this user will 
not see the invitation attribution screen. However, because of randomization, there is little reason for this 
scenario to arise systematically in any treatment group, and as such is not a major threat to our inference. 
Additionally, this is not relevant in Study 2, as all invitations and attributions are digitally tracked. 
12 However, even if this scenario were to arise, it would result in an organic user attributing his/her 
invitation to a new player and vice-versa. If such invitation attribution cycles occur, these data points are 
excluded from the analysis. Moreover, there is little reason for this scenario to arise systematically in any 
treatment group. Additionally, this scenario is not able to arise in Study 2. 
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defined as those who downloaded the app since its release and updated 13  it at the 
beginning of the experiment (treatment) period, and “new users” who joined during the 
experiment period. Because the app was newly released and had no prior brand history, 
the distinction between the new and existing users is likely based on their time of 
discovery of the app rather than any intrinsic difference between them. But even if these 
users have any intrinsic differences, randomization in the assignment of the users across 
the different treatment groups allows me to identify and compare the outcomes of the 
different incentive schemes (treatments). The duration of the pre-treatment and 
experimental (treatment) phases are reported in Table 1.  
 
Trial Phases Months (in 2014) 
Pre-Treatment Period March 22 – April 21 
Experiment (Treatment) Period April 22 – June 2 
Table 1. Trial Phases of the Experiment 
 
Group 
Control Group 
(No reward, no 
reminders) 
(Test Group 0)  
T0: No reward, 
but reminders 
(Test Group 1)  
T1: Selfish 
reward 
(Test Group 2) 
T2: Equal 
reward 
(Test Group 3) 
T3: Generous 
reward 
Assignment 
Probability 
0.12 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Table 2. Assignment Probability of Experiment Groups 
Users of the mobile application joined the trial either by discovering it organically 
while browsing the app stores (i.e., organic users) or by being invited by existing players. 
When a user joins the trial, she is randomly assigned to one of the five groups of the 
experiment according to the probabilities displayed in Table 2. Three of these groups 
                                                 
13 The app update was automatic for any existing user when they opened the app after the beginning of the 
experiment period. Users who never updated their app, i.e., who had stopped playing prior to the 
experiment period, were excluded from the trial. 
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were test groups defined by their referral reward structure – selfish (sender gets the entire 
incentive), equal split (incentive is equally divided), and pro-social (recipient gets the 
entire incentive)14. Users in all these groups got reminder notifications to invite their 
friends to play with, and to get rewarded according to the incentive structure on offer for 
that user’s group. A fourth treatment group (T0) had no referral rewards but provided 
users with the reminder notifications to invite new friends. Comparing the previous 
treatment groups with the fourth group allows me to see (in Section 3.3) that although 
customer pull-back mechanisms, such reminder notifications, are popular mechanism for 
promoting adoptions, the right incentive schemes can have a significant impact in 
accelerating adoption. The other is a control group – a group with no reward and no 
notification. This control group provides the benchmark for the diffusion rate of natural 
invites. Because social games require co-location of players, a user may already have 
some incentive to recruit other people to play the game with. This intrinsic motivation, if 
present in the population, will show up in this control group and anything I observe in the 
data from the treatment groups will be driven by what is over and above unobserved 
factors and caused by the randomized treatment. In Appendix Table 22 I show that there 
is no significant difference across the control and treatment population of existing users 
at the beginning of the experiment phase. 
Next I discuss how the users join the experiment phase of the trial. The 
experiment design randomly allocates users into test groups according to assignment 
probabilities in Table 2, and the experiment duration is the same for each group. The 
                                                 
14 While a continuous range of incentive splits of the form (x, 100 – x) between sender and recipient are 
possible, I chose (100, 0), (50, 50), and (0, 100) as the treatment options because these can be 
unambiguously interpreted as purely selfish, equal split, and purely generous.  
  25 
treatment assignment is constant for a given user for the entire duration of the experiment.  
When a player enters the experiment by downloading or updating the app (for existing 
users), she immediately enters a one-week period, called the incentivized period, during 
which the player can earn the referral reward for inviting new users. As discussed 
previously in Section 3, a new user can identify who her sender was and the reward 
received (if any) by the sender and recipient is based on the group that the sender belongs 
to, provided that the sender is still in the incentivized period. When a recipient attributes 
the invitation to a sender, the incentivized period for that sender resets. However if a 
recipient attributes an invitation to an sender when the sender is no longer in her 
incentivized period, then no reward is given out for that particular invitation but the 
incentivized period of the sender resets. Further invite attributions by new recipients will 
allow the sender to continue remain in an active incentivized period. Even though it does 
not empirically appear to be the case, it is arguably possible that the resetting of 
incentivized period for those who successfully invited someone within a week may 
potentially result in endogenous treatment durations. Therefore, I examine the sensitivity 
of the main results to this issue by restricting the sample to the first seven days in the 
experiment phase for all the users when they are equal in terms of being in incentivized 
treatment period and randomly assigned.    
In summary, based on the experiment design, when a user updates or downloads 
the app during the experiment period, regardless of whether she is an existing user or a 
new user, she will be randomly assigned to one of the groups and be a subject of the 
experiment. For each group, there are a similar number of existing users and new users 
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who were the part of the experiment for a similar period of time15. The referral incentives 
I offered during the trial were 1000 virtual coins that can be redeemed at any time in the 
app to purchase additional content and cosmetic game items16. That is, a sender in a 
selfish reward group will get all the 1000 coins and recipient gets nothing, in an equal 
reward group both the sender and recipient get 500 coins each, and an sender in the 
generous reward group gets nothing but the recipient gets all the 1000 coins. Here, 1000 
virtual coins are equivalent to $1 in worth, a value that compares well with the average 
price of such online apps. It bears mention that I do not consider the case where both 
sender and recipient get 1000 coins each because it is akin to “growing the size of the 
pie” instead of dividing it. A profit-seeking game developer is interested in only awarding 
a certain amount of virtual coins per referral (e.g., 1000 coins in this case) and the 
question is how to split it in a way that improves referral-based adoption of the game. 
As mentioned earlier, the mobile application also gave reminder notifications17 to 
the players in the four treatment groups during their incentivized period about the 
rewards they can receive upon inviting new people to adopt the game. Fig. 2 shows the 
                                                 
15 Since players join the experiment at the different time point during the experiment period, the panel is 
imbalanced at an individual level but balanced at the group level because of random assignment. I later 
show this using a variable ‘join_time_duration’. 
16 These game items are question cards, user avatars, virtual weapons, etc. As these items are tied to the 
purchasing user and provide them with features that others don’t have, they largely have an individual 
value. But arguably, in a social setting these items can also increase engagement of other players within a 
round of the game. In Table 20 of Appendix A, I therefore provide results with the number of other players 
included as a control. Additionally, Study 2 does not have such issues, as the reward is entirely monetary. 
17 The app provided two types of reminders – one is a local notification that is sent out the first time 3 hours 
after the app’s download (to nudge them to invite friends) and then onwards on every Friday (to encourage 
them to play the party game in the upcoming weekend), the other is an in-app notification that is visible in 
the home screen once the app is launched. These reminder mechanisms were consistent across all 
treatments. The difference in results I find across the treatment groups is therefore driven by the incentive 
schemes. 
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screenshots for the reminders sent to the different groups of the trial to encourage offline 
WOM based invitations to their friends. 
Upon successful referrals, the senders and recipients also received messages 
informing them about the rewards they received. These sample messages are shown in 
Fig. 3. It is worth noting here that for the selfish reward group the app only informs the 
sender about the reward and does not reveal to the recipient that the sender was rewarded 
for the referral. This was done to reduce the potential negative impact that guilt may 
otherwise have in a social setting in the case of users assigned to the selfish reward 
group. 
 
Figure 2. Sample Reminder Notifications of Different Treatment Groups 
 
Figure 3. Sample Messages upon Successful Referrals 
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3.3 Study 1- Analyses and Results 
3.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The summary of the various groups and the referral reward mechanism for each group is 
listed in Table 3. In the trial period, there were 2092 players in total who adopted the app, 
out of which about 1664 were organic adopters (non-invited users who discovered the 
app on their own). 
Testgroup 
Referral Reward 
mechanism 
Sender 
Incentive (%) 
Recipient 
Incentive (%) 
Organic 
Users 
Control Group  No rewards, no reminders 0 0 181 
Treatment Group (T0) – 
No reward, but 
reminders 
No rewards, reminder 
notifications 
0 0 371 
Treatment Group (T1) – 
Selfish reward 
Sender gets 1000 virtual 
coins 
100 0 355 
Treatment Group (T2) – 
Equal reward 
Sender and Recipient both 
get 500 virtual coins each 
50 50 373 
Treatment Group (T3) – 
Generous reward 
Recipient gets 1000 virtual 
coins 
0 100 384 
Table 3. Summary of Experiment Groups and Incentive Schemes 
For each user, I know the time they joined the site, whether they joined the site 
before the experiment phase (existinguser = 1 for existing users, 0 for new users), and 
whether they joined the site on their own (invited = 1 when the user was invited, 0 when 
the user joined on her own). I define a variable, join_time_duration, measured as the 
number of days between the date when the user joined the trial and the end date of the 
trial (June 2), and a variable, app_update_date, measured as the number of days elapsed 
between the start date of the treatment phase of the trial (April 21) and the day when the 
user actually joined the treatment by updating (for existing users) or downloading their 
app (for new users). 
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In addition, I collect login and gaming activities for the users in the sample for the 
pre-treatment and treatment period regarding which group of players play together, the 
frequency and duration of games played by each group, the location at which the games 
are usually played, etc. For robustness purposes, such as establishing the equivalence of 
the treatment groups and control group, I constructed the following social engagement 
metrics: login_days (number of days that a user logged in), login_hours (number of hours 
that a user logged in), game_count (number of games that a user played), 
game_total_player (number of total players that a user played with), game_ave_player 
(average number of players a user played with), game_total_time (number of total 
seconds a user played a game), game_ave_time (average seconds of games a user 
played), and location_count (number of unique locations a user played at). 
3.3.2 Pre-treatment Balance 
I first analyze the data gathered in the pre-treatment period about the behavior of the 
players assigned to the control and experimental groups to check if there are any 
statistically significant characteristic differences between these groups. The summary 
statistics and comparisons of the pre-treatment behavior across users in the different 
treatment and control groups are given in Appendix Table 22. I find the treatment and 
control groups have statistically indistinguishable properties, evidenced by a lack of a 
directional pattern in the magnitude as well as a lack of significance, prior to 
manipulation. This is expected given random assignment, but it is standard protocol in 
the in-vivo field experiment literature to establish this (Bapna and Umyarov 2016). 
3.3.3 Effects of Incentive Structure on the Number of Induced Adoptions  
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In the analysis, I focus the study on the behavior of the 1664 organic adopters (i.e., those 
who discovered the mobile game application from the app store18) across the different 
treatment and control groups because these individuals are completely free of any 
priming effects of generosity or selfishness that will be present among subsequent 
senders19.  
I begin the analysis by exploring changes in the number of adoptions (e.g. 
successful invites) that were induced by the treatment over the incentivized period. Given 
randomization, I can analyze the aggregate effect of the treatment using t-tests. Table 4 
indicates that only the generous group beat control in the Adoption_count. The generous 
group outperforms T0, the no reward but reminders group at the alpha=0.1 level. 
Testgroup Mean SE Std Dev Min Max 
t-value 
(Treatment vs. 
Control) 
Pr >t 
 
Control 0.0216 0.0132 0.1793 0 2 
    
T0: No reward, but 
reminders 
0.0318 0.0118 0.2284 0 2 0.58 0.5637 
T1: Selfish reward 0.0386 0.0155 0.2948 0 3 0.83 0.4048 
T2: Equal reward 0.0521 0.0159 0.3106 0 3 1.48 0.1401 
T3: Generous reward 0.0662 0.0181 0.3581 0 3 1.99 0.0469 
Table 4 : The mean comparison of the number of adoptions across groups 
                                                 
18 I would like to note that the study focuses on encouraging WOM from the population organic users, who 
likely have a pre-disposition to engage with the app in context. In practice, marketers too care about 
designing referral reward programs directed at early adopters to help reach a critical mass of users. 
19 In other words, those players who were themselves invited by organic users may be primed differently 
depending on what referral reward they received (if any) at the time of invite attribution. Studying the 
effect of priming on subsequent behavior of non-organic adopters would be an interesting extension. 
Unfortunately, this present data set does not have enough power to obtain statistically significant results on 
this issue.   
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Given that the outcome variable Adoption_count is a count variable, I also verify 
the result from Table 4 using a Poisson regression (Table 5) using treatment as an 
independent variable uncorrelated with the residual. As demonstrated in Tables 4 and 5, 
only the average effect of generous treatment on new invites is significant.  
Parameter Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald 95% 
Confidence Limits 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -3.8122 0.5000 -4.7922 -2.8322 58.13 <.0001 
T0: No reward, but 
reminders 
0.0952 0.1443 -0.1877 0.3781 0.44 0.5094 
T1: Selfish reward 0.5791 0.5669 -0.5321 1.6903 1.04 0.3070 
T2: Equal reward 0.4432 0.2739 -0.0936 0.9799 2.62 0.1056 
T3: Generous reward 0.3732 0.1790 0.0223 0.7241 4.35 0.0371 
Table 5 : Result of Poisson model  
These results indicate that the test groups with no reward but only notification, the 
selfish referral reward (i.e., sender gets the whole reward) and the equal split reward (i.e., 
fair division) do not perform much better than the control group. However, the players in 
the generous group promote a significantly higher number of adoptions than the players 
in the control group. This provides initial evidence that, in the context of mobile social 
games, reward schemes with a pro-social component tend to dominate the egocentric 
referral schemes. Because the outcome measure is self-reported, it could be the case that 
the generous scheme may be linked with higher propensity amongst recipients to report, 
and conversely a lower propensity to report if there is nothing in it for the recipients. I 
argue that such a behavior is not without a significant social cost, which is substantial in a 
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physical co-located setting, of denying someone you are going to socially interact with a 
fairly obtained monetary reward. Further, I deal with this potential bias by virtue of 
replicating the treatment design in Study 2 (presented in Section 4), a non-collocated, 
fully online setting where there is no self-reporting involved.  
3.3.4 Robustness -- Panel Data Analysis for Treatment Effects 
 
This experiment has time varying treatment durations from two sources. Firstly, in purely 
exogenous fashion, the treatment is applied to existing users at the start of the experiment 
and to incoming users during the course of the experiment. Secondly, because of the 
incentive period resetting feature (a practical consideration on the part of the gaming 
company to maximize adoption) in the design, the treatment, as discussed before, 
potentially has endogenous, time varying treatment durations at the individual level.   
Therefore, I checked the empirical distribution of the treatment periods across the 
cells for the full duration of the experiment and found no significant difference in the 
balance of the panels as shown in the Tables 6. The analysis variable, 
incentivized_period_num, in Table 6 captures the number of days a user of a given group 
spent in the active incentivized phase. 
Testgroup 
incentivized_period_num 
Mean Std Error Std Dev 
Control 8.1718 0.1136 2.2253 
T0: No reward, but 
reminders 
8.1347 0.1164 2.2417 
T1: Selfish reward 8.1690 0.1142 2.1523 
  33 
T2: Equal reward 8.3056 0.1063 2.0525 
T3: Generous reward 8.2983 0.1455 1.9577 
    
p value for joint test   0.7821 
Table 6 : Treatment periods across the groups for the full duration of the experiment 
While in aggregate the treatments duration distributions appear identical across 
treatments, I use the individual level panel data to get a more robust treatment effect 
estimation, using fixed effects (justified below) to take into account time-invariant 
individual heterogeneity. The panel data is based on the information recorded about the 
organic users of the mobile game app in the various treatment groups. On every day t, I 
have collected the following data (Table 7), for each user: 
Notations Variable Descriptions 
 Number of invites by user i at time t 
 
Whether the user i in treatment group N is in the incentivized period 
(1 = incentivized period, 0 = others) 
Table 7 : Notations and Variable Description 
The variables  is my DV and  is the indicator 
for treatment in a specific incentive group. In this real-world field trial, as mobile gamers 
are loath to provide personal data, I do not have any demographic data (e.g., age, gender) 
about users. To evaluate the need for a fixed effects model, I performed the Hausman 
specification test (Greene 2008), which rejected the random effects model20. Therefore, I 
                                                 
20 The Hausman test for random effects versus fixed effects has a m-value = 11.34, (Pr > m) <0.023, hence 
random effects model is rejected. 
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use a two-way fixed effect (time period ) model with individual and time 
dummies as below21:  
 
                                
    
I present the results on the coefficients of the two-way fixed effects model for all 
organic users in Table 8, which shows the treatment effects of different incentive 
schemes on number of invites. Among the three types of incentive schemes, the estimates 
show, that generous rewards scheme is positive and significant at the 5% level and the 
split scheme is marginally significant. Robustness checks with the  and 
Game_total_player variables, which show similar qualitative results, are provided in 
Table 19, 20 of Appendix A.  
 
Variable Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.0033 0.0145 -0.23 0.8179 
T0 (No reward, but reminders) 0.0012 0.0018 0.69 0.4897 
T1 (Selfish) 0.0009 0.0018 0.51 0.6067 
T2 (Equal Split) 0.0033* 0.0018 1.85 0.0646 
T3 (Generous) 0.0072*** 0.0017 4.07 <.0001 
     Observations 34493 
R2 0.0877 
Table 8 : Effect of different incentive schemes on number of invites 
 
                                                 
21 The Wald test for joint significance of time-dummies marginally rejects the null hypothesis (p = 0.0591) 
that they are all insignificantly different from zero, and hence, a two-way (individual and time) fixed effect 
model is preferred.  
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I also find evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects for the generous cell 
depending on whether the user is a new user or an existing user. In the interest of brevity, 
the details are in Appendix B.  
3.3.5 Robustness – Eliminating the Treatment Resetting Period 
Finally, as a further means of eliminating any bias in our treatment effect due to 
potentially endogenous treatment durations caused by the resetting of the incentivized 
period, I check the sensitivity of these results by restricting the incentivized period to the 
first seven days in the experiment phase. In this phase, there is no resetting whatsoever 
and all users are equal in terms of being in incentivized treatment period and, of course, 
randomly assigned.   
In comparison to the previous results of the aggregate data based t-tests and 
Poisson regression, but along the lines of the panel data estimation of the previous sub-
section 3.3.4, this analysis allows me to see that both the equal split reward and generous 
reward schemes are significant in increasing the number of invited adoptions. Overall, the 
panel data models not only pick up the causal relation between the incentive schemes and 
the net count of invited adoptions, but also exploit the temporal information of which 
types of users (i.e., new versus existing) respond more to which type of incentive 
schemes, and thus yield a more precise treatment effect.  
In the strictest (most conservative) inference test of the treatment, when I rely on 
only the first seven days of the treatment period (to avoid potentially endogenous unequal 
treatment durations of the field experiment), I find that the generous treatment is 2.2 
times (Wald Statistic = 4.16, p = 0.0414) more effective as compared to the selfish 
treatment and 1.6 times (Wald Statistic = 2.36, p = 0.1243) higher (but not statistically 
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significantly different) than the split treatment in generating a conversion. Thus, it is clear 
that a budget-constrained marketer would choose to invest the marginal dollar in the 
generous incentive scheme over the selfish scheme.  
Variable Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.0041 0.0148 -0.27 0.7836 
T0 (No reward, but reminders) 0.0011 0.0019 0.59 0.5585 
T1 (Selfish) 0.0031 0.0019 1.66 0.1162 
T2 (Equal Split) 0.0043** 0.0018 2.31 0.0212 
T3 (Generous) 0.0069*** 0.0018 3.79 0.0002 
     Observations 34493 
R2 0.0872 
Table 9: Effect of incentive schemes in the first week of experiment 
 Although Study 1, based on a total-effect design with a mobile social game, 
allowed me to capture the overall effect of the different referral incentive schemes on 
offline WOM-based adoptions, its scope in revealing mechanism level insights into the 
incentive tradeoffs between the sender and the recipient is limited. This is due to the 
mobile environment’s inability of tracking which group of senders sent out more offline 
referrals and because of its reliance on self-reported invitation attribution by co-located 
recipients. Therefore, to overcome potential complications arising from interactions 
among subjects in uncontrolled environments (Walker and Muchnik 2014; Aral 2016) 
and to derive additional insights into how each type of referral scheme influences the two 
metrics of interest – sending rates and acceptance rates of invitations – I conducted a 
follow up controlled experiment that addressed some of the mechanism level limitations 
and generalizability aspects of the previous study.  
 
  37 
4. Study 2 - Controlled Laboratory Experiment 
For this second study, I developed a web-based word game and used the subject pool 
from my university’s behavioral lab22 to replicate the treatments (i.e., selfish, equal-split, 
generous) of the previous field experiment23. The design of this study overcomes the 
challenges of the previous experiment, and in the process helps us better understand the 
underlying mechanisms, in two key ways: 
(i) The referral process of the word game used an email-based invitation, which 
enabled authentication as well as tracking of the referrals sent out and accepted, thus 
avoiding any dependence on self-reported conversion outcomes. 
 (ii) The context is a single-player word game, which does not suffer from 
potential treatment interference and bias from user co-location. 
Overall, results of the Study 2 show that in the context of non-collocated non-
social all three incentives schemes beat the control group in generating new adoptions. 
What is interesting, however, is that digging deeper into the tradeoffs between 
incentivizing the receiver versus the sender of the referrals I find that a) there is no 
significant difference in the sending rates at the 5% level of significance (the selfish 
scheme is marginally significant at the alpha = 10% level), b) that the generous group has 
a significantly stronger effect on the receiver’s likelihood of adopting (estimates are 
identical using clustered errors of random effects for the senders), and c) the conversion 
rate is significantly higher for the generous group.  Thus, while at the aggregate level, in 
Study 2’s context of non-social games, I find that all three incentives schemes are equally 
                                                 
22 Although the participants were recruited using the behavioral lab’s mailing list, this was not a typical lab 
study; it was an online, randomized, controlled trial of a simple word scramble game that I developed.   
23 I did not implement the reminders feature; hence the treatment with no reward but reminders is absent. 
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effective in bringing new adoptions, at the mechanism level, the results from this study 
demonstrate the efficacy of pro-social incentives over selfish schemes in generating 
referral conversions, as well as a presence of a significant, Leontief style, altruistic 
component in the subject’s utility function. The result that there is no degradation in the 
sender’s decision to initiate referrals as money is taken away from her and given to the 
sender indicates that such agents’ utility is composed of both self-maximizing 
components and altruistic components in equal parts. This provides further evidence that 
a budget-constrained marketer should lean towards using referral incentive schemes that 
have a significant pro-social component in them, ceteris paribus.  
4.1. Study 2 - Design Details 
I developed a web-based word scramble game and recruited 71 participants from my 
school’s behavioral lab mailing list to serve as the pool of senders who were to refer the 
game to their peers (i.e., the general member population at the University who were not 
in the lab’s participant pool). This population is not inherently an unrepresentative pool 
for gaming as this segment can represent up to 25% of mobile game players24. All the 71 
study participants as well as their recipients had to be affiliated to the University, and 
thereby in possession of a uniquely identifiable University email account that would have 
to be used in the game’s login process. This allowed me to not only track the email 
invitations sent and authenticate the senders and recipients, but also prevent the creation 
of fake accounts for the study. To facilitate the referral process, I integrated a directory 
search feature in the game that allowed senders to lookup their recipient’s valid email 
address and send an invitation mail with a standard template. 
                                                 
24 http://www.vertoanalytics.com/chart-week-mobile-gamer-demographics/ 
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The study participants (i.e., senders) were randomly assigned to one of the four 
groups, one control group and three treatment groups25. All of them received a $10 for 
creating an account on the game site and playing the game26. Any additional rewards 
earned by a participant for each successful referral depended on the treatment group to 
which that individual had been assigned. A successful referral was defined as being one 
where a recipient signed up for the game by creating an account with their email on the 
web site27. For each successful referral, participants assigned to the selfish group (Group 
1) received $3 while participants in the equal split group (Group 2) received $2 and 
participants in the generous group (Group 3) received $1. Recipients of participants in the 
selfish group, equal split group, and generous group received $1, $2 and $3, respectively. 
Those assigned to the control group had the same option to invite their friends by email 
but received no additional compensation for the referral. Recipients did not have the 
option to invite others.       
The referral period lasted for a week and the study was conducted entirely online, 
thus eliminating the need for the participants to gather for pre-study briefings and 
reducing the possibility of contamination across treatment groups. Figure 4 shows the 
screenshot of the word game and Figure 5 shows the referral page for selfish treatment 
group. 
                                                 
25 I ensure that the senders are well balanced across all the covariates  
26 All compensations were given out using Amazon eGift cards at the end of the experiment 
27  To prevent fraudulent signups, I checked in real-time on the recipient’s email address against the 
database to ensure that this email account that was being used in the sign up process was valid and indeed 
one to which an invitation had been mailed by one of the senders. If a receiver accepted invites from 
multiple senders, then they were excluded from the study. 
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4.2. Study Results 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
Figure 4: Screenshot of the Word Game and Referral Prompt for Selfish Treatment 
Figure 5 : Screenshot of the Referral Invitation Page 
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To identify the effect of different incentive schemes on both sender’s likelihood to send 
and the recipient’s likelihood to accept referrals, I run the regression both at the sender 
level and recipient level (Duflo et al. 2008, Duflo et al. 2011).  
First, I relate the count data on the number of invitations sent by a sender 
(invite_num_sent) to dummy indicators of each of the treatment conditions (Equation 2) 
and run a negative binomial regression at the sender level to analyze the relationship 
between incentive schemes and the sender’s referral behavior (Equation 2)28.  
Log                                           (2) 
Log                                      (3) 
Table 10 shows the results for the effect of the incentive schemes on the number 
of referrals sent by study participants (i.e., senders) to their friends. I find that there is no 
significant different at the alpha = 0.05 level across the treatments in the sender’s referral 
behavior.  
Parameter Estimate SE 
Wald 95% 
Confidence Limits 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiS
q 
Intercept 0.2076 0.3765 -0.5302 0.9455 0.3 0.5812 
Group 1 (Selfish) 0.9531 0.514 -0.0544 1.9606 3.44 0.0637 
Group 2 (Equal) 0.5046 0.5206 -0.5159 1.525 0.94 0.3325 
Group 3 (Generous) 0.5808 0.5242 -0.4466 1.6082 1.23 0.2679 
Table 10: Effect of incentive schemes on the number of referrals 
This is a somewhat surprising result, especially if I assume purely economic 
rational agents. Ex ante, I might expect the referral rate should decline as money is taken 
away from senders and given to recipients in the equal and generous treatments, i.e. when 
                                                 
28 Goodness of Fit results show that negative binomial model form fit our data (Chi2(99) = 73.52, p = 
0.97418) while Poisson model does not (Chi2(99) = 485.119, p = 0). Results using OLS are also provided 
in Appendix C. 
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they receive smaller incentives with altruistic approaches. Instead what I observe is that 
the effect of monetary loss is being supplemented by the gain from altruistic utility, and 
that self-regarding and other-regarding two components of the utility are acting as pure 
substitutes in a Leontief manner.   
Subsequently, I run the regression (Equation 3) to analyze the relationship 
between various incentive schemes and the successful referral outcomes 
(invite_num_converted) as well as on the recipients’ decision to adopt.  The results are 
for the former are reported in Table 11. The results show that all three incentive schemes 
significantly increase the number of successful referrals compared to the control group, 
with the generous and split treatment having a slightly higher (but not statistically 
distinguishable) effect than the selfish scheme.  
 
Parameter Estimate SE 
Wald 95% 
Confidence Limits 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiS
q 
Intercept -1.3122 0.4723 -2.2378 -0.3865 7.72 0.0055 
Group 1 (Selfish) 1.4214 0.5811 0.2824 2.5604 5.98 0.0145 
Group 2 (Equal) 1.4553 0.5802 0.3182 2.5924 6.29 0.0121 
Group 3 (Generous) 1.4606 0.5839 0.3162 2.605 6.26 0.0124 
Table 11: Effect of incentive schemes on the number of adoptions 
In contrast to the previous experiment with the mobile social app, the selfish 
scheme has a significant effect in this word game. This may be attributable to the fact that 
the participants recruited from the behavioral lab may be more eager to receive monetary 
rewards and the online referral setting provides less reason for them to feel guilty about 
deriving monetary rewards from the referral process.  
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Further, the detailed online data allows me to derive some additional insights into 
the underlying effect of the referral schemes on the sending and acceptance rate of 
referrals. Especially, I find that the conversion rate of referrals sent from equal split group 
and generous group is 62% and 51% higher than the conversion rate of the selfish group, 
which is 159% and 141% higher than the conversion rate of the control group. Figure 6 
shows that this difference is statistically different. Given that all three schemes have 
similar sending rates, a higher conversion rate in the pro-social scheme is an interesting 
finding that deserves further investigation.  
 
Figure 6: Referral conversion rate of each group 
I further drill down and find that this higher conversion is driven by the impact of 
incentive schemes on recipient’s decision to accept. A random effects model (following 
Bapna and Umyarov 2016) at the recipient level is tested using the specification in 
Equation 4.  indicates recipient’s i’s decision to adopt after 
receiving sender’s j’s referral.  
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                                             (4) 
The results are reported in Table 12, which shows that only the equal split and 
generous treatments are significant in driving referral conversions. Thus, at the recipient 
level it appears to be the case that the adoption follows the rational economic paradigm. 
Recipients respond more favorably when they revive a larger monetary share. Overall, 
taking the two studies together, it is clear that a budget-constrained marketer who is 
trying to maximize the size of the user base should use an altruistic scheme even if it is to 
just provide higher incentives for new adopters. As I showed earlier in this section the 
altruistic schemes do not reduce the incentives to send out the invitations, in other words 
referrals are either positively or non-negatively affected by the altruistic design, and 
given that the adoption follows the rational economic paradigm, using an altruistic design 
is better.  
Effect Estimate SE t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.235 0.06363 3.69 0.0003 
Group 1 (Selfish) 0.09105 0.07715 1.18 0.2388 
Group 2 (Split) 0.2113 0.08506 2.48 0.0135 
Group 3 (Generous) 0.1738 0.08226 2.11 0.0354 
Table 12: Effect of incentive schemes on the referral acceptance by recipients 
These results together provide some insights into how a decision maker should 
think about the various tradeoffs induced by the referral incentive schemes they choose 
and suggest that the some of the incentive amounts from the sender can indeed by 
diverted to the receiver without hurting the sending rates. The results are robust across 
alternative specifications at both levels, including count models at the sender level and 
binary outcome model at the recipient level. Specifically, I obtain consistent results using 
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Poisson model at the sender level and linear probability model as well as probit and logit 
models at the recipient level (see Appendix C, Table 27-30). 
5. Discussion  
Understanding how incentive structure causally impacts the diffusion of products through 
both offline and online WOM is a crucial step in developing referral reward strategies for 
viral adoption of digital goods. Given that a successful referral required positive action 
from both a sender and a recipient, any incentive mechanism that aims to accelerate 
organic WOM has to delicately balance the tradeoff between rewarding the sender and 
the receiver. I explored this issue by designing two related but contextually different 
studies in which I tested the effectiveness of selfish, equal, and generous referral 
rewarding schemes. The context of Study 1 was a mobile social game application with no 
prior brand history and other priming effects, which allowed me to design a clean study 
on the effect of online referral reward structure on the offline diffusion of the product. 
Study 2 allowed me to dig deeper into the underlying mechanisms as it did not suffer 
from some of the measurement limitations of tracking offline word-of-mouth in a mobile 
environment.  In Study 2, I developed a web-based word game and used the subject pool 
from my university’s behavioral lab to replicate the treatments (i.e., selfish, equal-split, 
generous) of the previous field experiment. Study 1 is unique and distinct in the IS 
literature in its use of geo-sensing based measurement to capture offline word-of-mouth. 
However, it also poses two specific challenges. Firstly, Study 1’s design does not capture 
the differential effect of the treatments on the sending of referrals. Further, because of the 
co-location based nature of the game the outcome is self-reported and the recipients’ 
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propensity to report could be correlated to treatment. Study 2 overcomes these limitations 
and takes place in a non-colocation/social based gaming context. The entire referral 
process is implemented online and allows for full tracking at the sending and accepting 
sides, without the need for self-reporting. 
Overall, taking the two studies together, the results suggests that a budget-
constrained marketer who is trying to maximize the size of the user base should use an 
altruistic scheme even if it is to just provide higher incentives for new adopters.  I find 
that altruistic schemes do not reduce the incentives to send out the invitations, in other 
words referrals are either positively or non-negatively affected by the altruistic design. 
This coupled with the fact that the recipients’ adoption behavior follows the rational 
economic paradigm, it becomes evident that using altruistic pro-social component is 
advisable. I observe that in contrast to expectations of behaviors by rational economic 
agents, the altruistic design does not reduce sender participation, implying that senders do 
not act from purely economic perspective and that their utility has explicit valuation for 
altruism. 
This work complements two streams of prior research on viral marketing: 
estimating causal peer influence in social networks, and constructing referral incentive 
schemes to promote WOM based adoption. Although previous studies using 
randomization trials have demonstrated peer influence at work, there hasn’t been much 
empirical investigation to discover how different referral incentive schemes drive the 
peer influence in the social contagion process. Existing studies of designing referral 
incentives on WOM mainly focused on senders’ behavior and rarely considered incentive 
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sharing schemes in which both parties may receive rewards. I contribute to the literature 
by studying how an important mechanisms of social contagion, online and offline word 
of mouth, are causally influenced by the design of the referral incentive scheme, namely, 
selfish reward, equal split reward, and generous reward schemes. The findings of the 
study are thus relevant to creating referral programs to promote WOM based adoption of 
digital goods. 
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Essay 2: Altruism Pays! Towards Optimal Call-to-Action  
for Online Referral 
1. Introduction and Theoretical Background 
Concomitant with the exploding growth of digital social networks and the importance of 
word-of-mouth, firms recognize the importance of using referral programs towards 
driving new business. Such schemes encourage existing customers with an incentive-
laden call-to-action to engage their social networks by informing them about products 
and ultimately influencing and stimulating friends’ purchase decisions. While referral 
marketing is a widely adopted practice, the underlying science behind understanding and 
optimizing its various dimensions is nascent. As an example, while call-to-action design 
for online referral to the sender is one of the key design choices for the optimal design of 
online referral programs, no study has investigated how firms can optimally design the 
call-to-action to engage customers in initiating referrals in the first place. Given the 
increasing importance of online referral programs, it is crucial to close this gap. 
Therefore, in this essay, I tackle the question of the optimal design of the call-to-action 
for online referrals. 
My perspective in approaching this design question is theoretical. As mentioned 
above, I view online referrals as incentive-laden word-of-mouth mechanisms. The 
fundamental building block of successful word-of-mouth based product diffusion is 
delight among the existing base of customers (Kornish and Li 2010), which then is 
communicated to relevant portions of their social networks, whose actors within might 
also, ostensibly, experience similar delight, benefit, or gain positive utility from adopting 
the focal product. This concern for the benefit of the other suggests that a necessary 
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condition for successful online referral is the altruistic consideration of the sender 
towards the recipient’s welfare in adopting the product.  Of course, it is well known that 
individuals may themselves derive significant non-monetary payoff from helping others 
in the form of either pure altruism or warm-glow (Andreoni 1988, 1990). Thus, an 
altruistic call may enhance customers’ pure or warm-glow altruism, and therefore 
encourage more sharing from them. Prior literature also suggests that an altruistic call 
may reduce customers’ psychological cost of feeling guilty about gaining referral rewards 
(Rue and Feick 2007). Taken together, these theoretical ideas suggest that an altruistic 
frame of mind is likely to result in higher quality of advocacy which might be associated 
with reduced guilt in receiving a monetary award for someone else’s action, better 
targeting of people who are more likely to receive positive utility from the product, 
greater effort in communicating the potential benefits, or, some mixture of these. Yet, a 
close look at influential referral programs in the practice29 reveals that companies do not 
necessarily hone in on this theoretical insight and exhibit significant heterogeneity (or, 
arguably, lack of thoughtfulness) in their design of all three aspects of online referrals. 
Consistent with the above theoretical argument, the results of my first essay show that an 
altruistic component in the incentive scheme, either via splitting the incentive equally 
between the sender and the recipient or purely rewarding the recipient, significantly 
outperforms purely rewarding just the sender.  Sun et al. 2015 finds that when a single-
use promotional code targeted to the customers is made shareable, a significant portion of 
customers is willing to pass on the code to their friends, rather than using it themselves.   
                                                 
29 Please see an excellent summary of influential referrals programs 
(http://www.referralcandy.com/blog/47-referral-programs/), including links to referral programs run by 
leading firms like Paypal, Uber and Airbnb e.g. https://www.airbnb.com/invite)  
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With respect to the framing of the call-to-action, the focus of this study, the 
current state of affairs reveals that while companies are seen to be ‘experimenting’ with 
multiple types of call-to-action for online referrals, the ‘altruistic’ call-to-action, honing 
in and emphasizing the recipients’ monetary benefit, is, anecdotally, seldom observed30. 
This is potentially driven by firms’ perception that the sender may be more likely to 
initiate a referral if her own, ostensibly monetary, benefit is highlighted.  In line with this 
thinking, I see a prevalence of what I call the ‘egoistic’ call-to-action, where the firm 
highlights the reward (often a discount coupon or cash incentive) to the sender, and, also 
in several cases, what I call an ‘equitable’ call-to-action, where the firm highlights that 
both sender and her friends get the reward. While the exact distribution of the usage of 
these three types of call-to-action is unknown due to lack of comprehensive proprietary 
data31, what is more interesting from a research perspective is a controlled scientific 
‘horse-race’ between these three schemes and a generic call-to-action, which will serve as 
the control group. I conduct this horse race using the methodology of a randomized field 
experiment (Aral and Walker 2011b, Bapna and Umyarov 2016, Ghose et al. 2015) that 
is becoming the gold standard in the information systems literature.  
As mentioned earlier, I am particularly interested in the role of altruistic framing32 
in driving customer’s referral decision and related outcomes as it contradicts 
conventional wisdom, and the observed norm in practice. Perhaps driven by an over 
                                                 
30 The argument is based on observations of more than 400 A/B testing conducted by the companies on the 
one of the largest referral platform in the past 6 months  
31 However, a quick search over the referral programs and promotional emails conducted by major 
companies in Airline (e.g. Southwest), Credit Card (Chase Freedom, Sapphire) and Hotel Chain industry 
(Hilton, Marriott) industry shows that egoistic framing is dominating. Almost all emails promoting referrals 
program in those companies adopt egoistic framing in their title.  
32 From now on I use the word “altruism” to cover both warm glow and pure altruism (Andreoni 1990) 
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emphasis on homo-economicus styled, self-maximizing thinking from economics, the 
industry norm is to emphasize the benefit of the referral incentive to the senders to 
stimulate their act of referring. However, there is reason to believe that this can be 
counter-productive, as highlighting of one’s own reward may increase psychological and 
social cost of the sender by creating a feeling of guilt (Ryu and Feick 2007, Smith et al. 
1999). On the other hand, as discussed above, customers may derive non-monetary 
payoff if they care about friends’ payoff (pure altruism) or about the referral action itself 
(warm glow). If altruism plays an important role in referral behavior, then I would expect 
the altruistic call might significantly increase a sender’s likelihood of sharing, since 
customers who share because of specific motive (e.g. altruism) will more likely respond 
to the corresponding framing (e.g. emphasizing altruism). However, if the argument of 
the friend’s interest is taken a step further, it can be the case that the existing customer 
will become more selective in referral as they care and deliberate more about friend’s 
payoff from purchasing the focal product (Kornish and Li 2010). Thus, the altruistic call 
might also lead to lower likelihood of sharing and fewer shares by the senders because it 
becomes harder for them to identify potential recipients. Given the mentioned tradeoffs 
and theoretical predictions, it becomes interesting to test in the field whether altruistic 
framing always leads to larger volume of referrals or not. Specifically, I test the following 
hypothesis via the research design: 
Null hypothesis 1A(Main effect): The three types of calls-to-action, egoistic, 
equitable, and altruistic, are indistinguishable from each other and the control 
group with respect to the volume of word-of-mouth referrals.  
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Alternate hypothesis 1A(Main effect): The altruistic call-to-action outperforms the 
control, egoistic and equitable calls-to-action with respect to the volume of word-of-
mouth referrals. 
Regarding the outcome of the referrals, as mentioned above, if customers become 
more selective in referral because of altruism, the altruistic call is likely to result in fewer 
referral outcomes. However, this potential downside can arguably be counter-balanced by 
the fact that conditional on the referral decision, such selective referrals driven by 
altruism may be better targeted and therefore result in a higher conversion rate than those 
driven by other motives, such as the equitable and selfish. I thus hypothesize and test the 
following: 
Null hypothesis 1B(Main effect): The three types of calls-to-action are 
indistinguishable from each other and the control group with respect to the 
outcomes of word-of-mouth referrals, i.e. total number of successful referrals. 
Alternate hypothesis 1B(Main effect): The altruistic call-to-action outperforms the 
control, egoistic, and equitable calls-to-action with respect to outcomes of word-of-
mouth referrals. 
If altruism is an important driver of online referrals, I should see the higher 
impact of altruistic framing for customers with a higher affinity of the product, as 
customers will care more about their friend’s utility and in this case, customers will 
project their own evaluation onto others (Cronbach 1955; Ichheiser 1946). Thus, those 
customers with a higher affinity may be more likely to infer that their friends would also 
gain benefits or positive utility from the product; thus are more likely to share. Customers 
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with high affinity of the product can be represented by the number of repeat purchases 
(Hoyer, 1984) and by a high reported net promoter score (hereafter, NPS) (e.g. willing to 
share the product) (Reichheld 1996). Thus, I test the following hypothesis by exploring 
the heterogeneity in treatment effect: 
Null hypothesis 2A(Mechanism): Customer affinity of the product, as measured by 
the repeat purchases and their net promoter score, will not significantly moderate 
the effect of three types of calls-to-action on referral behavior.  
Alternate hypothesis 2A(Mechanism): Customer affinity will, uniquely, positively 
moderate the effect of the altruistic call-to-action on referral behavior. 
Furthermore, I expect the effect of altruistic framing may be depending on the 
recency of customers’ last purchase, whereas the effects of other framings are less so. 
This is likely to happen because sharing under altruistic considerations is more driven by 
intrinsic delight and enthusiasm for the product (Kornish and Li 2010), rather than 
external incentive; but such delight/enthusiasm (to share the product) may decay over 
time after customers’ purchase (Berger and Schwartz 2011). Thus, I expect the effect of 
altruistic framing, which is closely related to the altruism in sharing, would be highest for 
customers who purchased and got the product recently, and would be lower for customers 
who made the purchase a while ago. In contrast, I expect the effect of egoistic framing, 
which provokes referrals with external incentive, on referral behavior won’t decrease 
over time compared to other framing as the external incentive for customers to make 
referral is independent of when the customers made the last purchase. In other words, the 
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value of material payoff will never decay but intrinsic motivations will. I thus 
hypothesize and test the following: 
Null hypothesis 2B(Mechanism): The recency of the past purchase, as measured by 
the time since latest purchase, will not significantly interact with the three types of 
calls-to-action on customers’ referral behavior.  
Alternate hypothesis 2B(Mechanism): The recency of the past purchase will 
positively moderate the effect of the altruistic call-to-action on customers’ referral 
behavior.  
In addition, aligned with the theorizing about the mechanism underlying the effect 
of different calls-to-action, I expect the motives to share and not to share would also be 
different across groups. Specifically, I hypothesize that altruistic framing would reduce 
the sender’s guilt from engaging in referral program with incentives, especially compared 
to other framings (Ryu and Feick 2007). It is also likely that those who share under 
altruistic framing are more likely to focus on the benefits of others (i.e. family/friends), 
rather than one’s own payoff. As an outcome, those customers may also become more 
selective in referral as they care and deliberate more about their friend’s payoff (Kornish 
and Li 2010). Therefore, with the objective of uncovering the underlying motives that 
distinguish the success of a particular type of call-to-action, I test the following: 
Null hypothesis 3 (Motive): Customer motives will not significantly vary across the 
three types of calls-to-action.  
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Alternate hypothesis 3A(Motive): Customers targeted with the altruistic call-to-
action will report lower levels of guilt and be more selective in identifying friends 
who will benefit from the shared product.  
Alternate hypothesis 3B(Motive): Customers who share referrals under the 
altruistic call-to-action will be more likely to identify family and friends’ benefits as 
the motive, and less likely to identify their own benefits as the motive for sharing. 
In this essay, I posit, test, identify, and understand the underlying motives behind 
the optimal call-to-action for online referrals. I do so in collaboration with a large US 
based online platform specialized in photo processing and related products (their revenue 
for 2015 was $22 million). I conduct a large randomized field experiment involving 
100,000 customers to test the impact of three afore-mentioned call-to-actions. I fix the 
incentive design of the referral program as equal-split as well as the recipients’ message 
and only vary the call-to-action to the senders in the experiment. I am interested in 
identifying the causal effect of the framing of the calls-to-action on customers’ referral 
decision, whether they share and to what extent they share, as well as on their induced 
referral outcomes as measured by the number of successful referrals. Specifically, I 
randomly assign 100,000 customers who have made purchases on the platform in the past 
4 months into four test groups (10,000 in control and 30,000 in each of the three 
treatment groups), and email each group with different calls-to-action (Figure 7). I 
collected data on customers’ referral behaviors and outcomes within a 5-week window 
after the experiment. I further augmented the data from field experiment with rich 
archival data, including product characteristics, individual characteristics, their past 
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purchases and their NPS scores. I also conduct a large-scale post-experiment survey to 
understand why customers in the experiment share or don’t share after receiving the call-
to-action. The data from the randomized experiment, the archival data, and the survey 
allows me to identify the causal effect of different calls-to-action as well as to explore the 
underlying mechanisms.  
The primary finding, consistent across multiple econometric specifications, is 
that, in line with the theoretical prediction and in contrast to conventional wisdom, the 
altruistic framing of the call-to-action for initiating a referral is most effective in driving 
referral behavior and resulting in the best outcomes for the firm. Compared to the control 
group with information about the fixed incentive scheme, the email that highlights 
friends' reward significantly increases not only the likelihood of sender making referrals, 
but also the total number of successful referral purchases. In addition, I find that the 
effect of altruistic framing is significantly higher than the effect of egoistic framing and 
equitable framing across all the referral behaviors and outcome (Hypothesis 1A, 1B). 
Secondly, I find large heterogeneity in treatment effects across different customer 
segments, yielding interesting insights into the underlying mechanisms that support the 
main finding. Specifically, consistent with the underlying theoretical premise of customer 
delight as a necessary condition for effective word-of-mouth, I find that the altruistic 
framing is more effective for users who made repeat purchases in the past and for those 
that reported higher NPS scores (Hypothesis 2A). This is aligned with the notion that 
customers who have higher level of product and brand affinity are more likely to share it 
with their friends for altruistic purpose as they believe their friend would also like the 
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product and derive benefit from the purchase. Finally, I find that the effect of altruistic 
framing is positively moderated by the recency of the purchase (Hypothesis 2B). In 
contrast, I did not observe such significant decay for other types of framing that 
highlights the referral incentive to the sender. This is consistent with the fact that 
customers’ inherent enthusiasm to talk about the product may decay over time after new 
purchase (Berger and Schwartz 2011).  
 I further investigate the underlying motives by conducting a post-experiment 
survey. The results from the survey suggest that an altruistic call-to-action for online 
referrals is associated with a reduction in customers' feeling of guilt in making referrals 
compared to control and egoistic call-to-action but is not linked with the perceived 
difficulty of finding a friend who may like the product compared to control and equitable 
call-to-action (Hypothesis 3A). I also find that customers who are under altruistic framing 
are more likely to report that friends and family might be happy with the promotion as 
their motive of sharing (Hypothesis 3B). Overall, the evidence suggests that altruism is 
important in driving online referral and it can be spurred by an altruistic call-to-action. 
 In addition to the theoretical contributions, this essay also provides clear 
managerial implications for firms. Based on the results from the experiment and survey, I 
offer concrete guidance to firms on how, to whom, and when they should initiate call-to-
action for a referral, as well as why they should do so. Firstly, the main results suggest 
that in contrast to conventional wisdom, firms should more frequently use altruistic 
framing in their call-to-action as compared to the status quo of current practice. Secondly, 
the findings of large heterogeneity in treatment effects across different customer 
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segments suggests that, given the costs associated with referral marketing, firms should 
target customers with higher affinity first in their referral campaign. Thirdly, regarding to 
the timing, firms should send out an altruistic call-to-action for referral to customers 
shortly after their purchase. Finally, the results from the post experiment survey suggest 
that when designing the referral program, firms should try to reduce the guilt feeling of 
customers and to enhance the altruism to drive not only more but also more effective 
referrals. Interestingly, as I discuss in the conclusion, the optimal call-to-action for a 
referral also complements the optimal call-to-action for purchase (on how, to whom and 
when to call). Taken together, these insights have the potential to significantly impact and 
alter firms’ marketing communication. In fact, based on the results of the experiment, the 
altruistic call-to-action (along with the timing and targeting strategy) has been 
implemented by the collaborating platform (Collage.com), impacting hundreds of 
thousands of customers each year.  
 This essay draws from and contributes to several streams of literature at the 
intersection of information systems, marketing and economics. First, the study enriches 
the literature on digital word-of-mouth by identifying the causal effect of a call-to-action 
– one of the key elements in online referral programs. Although, designing key elements 
of an online referral program to drives social contagion has been of much interest to both 
academics and practitioners, identifying the causal effects of different design are 
methodologically hard because of endogeneity (Manski 1993). Using a large scale 
randomized experiment, I show that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom and current 
practice, altruistic framing works best in driving online referrals. A minor change in 
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framing may lead to significant increase in referral revenue. In this way, this essay also 
closes the gap of identifying the optimal design of online referral program (with my first 
essay on optimal incentive structure and Sun et al. 2014 on optimal message design).   
 This essay is also among the first to provide insights on the underlying motives of 
senders’ online referral. Specifically, the study provides concrete and causal support to 
the hitherto under-studied role of altruism in creating word-of-mouth. In the IS literature, 
a few studies have analyzed motives of online behaviors such as community participation 
and found that they are likely to be driven by altruism (Bitzer et al. 2007, Anderson and 
Agarwal 2011, Jabr et al. 2014, Xia, Huang, Duan, and Whinston 2012). However, 
despite the large volume of online referrals, little is understood about its underlying 
motives, as well as how companies can leverage such motives. This study, taking 
advantage of a randomized field experiment, and including a detailed analysis over 
multiple moderators and a large-scale survey, presents strong and consistent evidence that 
altruism is crucial in driving online referrals. This work also provides clear guidance on 
how firms can leverage altruism to improve online referral behavior and outcomes. 
2. Institutional Details and Experimental Design 
Along with my first essay, the initial idea of the experimental design comes from both the 
practice as well as seminal research in economics and social psychology that categorizes 
individuals into three categories based on their self and other regarding preferences 
(Andreoni and Miller 2002). The stream of literature shows that individuals can either be 
purely self-regarding, or caring about others’ benefits only as much as they care about 
themselves, or purely other-regarding. In line with this insight and my theorizing earlier, I 
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test the effect of three different calls-to-action for online referrals: a) the egoistic call-to-
action, where the framing highlights and emphasizes the reward to the sender, b) the 
equitable call to action, where the framing highlights and emphasizes that both sender 
and the receiver get the reward, and c) the altruistic call-to-action, where the framing 
highlights and emphasizes the reward to the receiver. I am especially interested in the 
role of altruism as discussed in the hypotheses. 
 The research site is an online platform, Collage.com, where users can design a 
collage by uploading photos and customizing the layout with the proprietary software 
tools. Once a user creates the layout, she can purchase various types of customized 
printed products, such as blankets, photo-books, canvases, etc. A large number of 
customers purchase a variety of products from the platform every day. The annual 
revenue of the platform is more than 22 million USD and the number of purchasers 
exceed more than 500,000 transactions per year. Given the volume of sales and the 
customer base, even a small increase in existing customers’ referrals would lead to a 
large increase in the firm’s revenue. Like many other specialized digital platforms, the 
platform does not have an existing online referral program at work but is strongly 
interested in its potential.  
 For the experiment, I create four versions of emails and the webpage by varying 
only the framing of the same incentive scheme, namely, the equal-split incentive scheme 
in which both sender and receiver get the identical reward (a 70% discount coupon). I 
randomly draw 100,000 unique customers who have purchased products in the previous 4 
months, and randomly assign them into one of the four test groups as per Figure 7. Then, 
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I target the customers in the different groups with emails that only vary in their call-to-
action for initiating the referral process. All other factors, including the equal-split 
incentive schema for the sender and the recipient and the message received by the 
recipient, ie what the recipient knows about the program, are kept constant across the 
four cells of our experiment. In each email, I change the email’s subject, highlight 
different aspects of the same incentive scheme in the given context, and use different 
wording in the call-to-action button (Figure 8, 9). Once the customers click on the ‘call-
to-action’ button in the email, they are directed to webpages with the consistent framing 
where they can send a referral to their friends. It is important to note that the same 
incentive scheme was offered to all participants across groups and the only difference is 
the framing of the referral program. Thus, the difference in customers’ referral behavior 
and outcomes can be attributed to such difference in framing. 
 
Figure 7 : Illustration of the Experiment Design 
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Group Subject and content of the email Content of the link page 
No 
framing 
(C) 
Subject: The Collage.com Referral Program 
Contents: 
 
 
 
  
Egoistic 
Framing 
(T1) 
Subject: Invite your friends, and get yourself 70% off 
Contents: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Example of Email/Link Page Received by Each User in Control/Egoistic Framing Groups 
* Note: I highlight the difference in framing across different test groups using box of red solid line 
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Group Subject and content of the email Content of the link page 
Equitable 
Framing 
(T2) 
Subject: 70% off for you and a friend! 
Contents:  
  
 
 
Altruistic 
Framing 
(T3) 
Subject: Give your friend a 70% discount! 
Contents:  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Example of Email/Link Page Received by Each User in Equitable/Altruistic Framing Groups 
* Note: I highlight the difference in framing across different test groups using box of red solid line
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 The emails were sent out on the same day, at the same time, and only once to each 
customer in the experiment33. Each customer was given a week to send referrals to their 
friends. Once a customer sends out a referral, a 70% discount coupon, which was valid 
for 30 days, was sent to both the sender and the receiver (the sender would get the 
discount coupon regardless of the referral outcome, and this is specified in the email). 
The email implementation gives me very strong control over the randomized field 
experiment. First, by targeting predefined randomly drawn customers, I can ensure that 
the randomization procedure is valid. Second, by restricting the treatment to the messages 
in the email and by keeping the webpage private and only linking to the corresponding 
email, I can eliminate potential interference across test groups. Finally, by sending the 
email once, I reduce the possibility of selection bias in repeated trials. 
 The randomization ensures that the call-to-action in the email is orthogonal to the 
customers’ previous behaviors. Therefore, any difference in the customers’ referral 
decision and outcomes can be solely and directly attributed to the difference in the 
received call-to-action for initiating the referral process. I observe several outcomes from 
the experiment. Firstly, I look at a binary indicator of whether a sender sent a referral. 
Secondly, I look at the total number of referrals sent by senders. Lastly, I check the 
number of recipients’ purchases originated by senders’ referrals. The three outcomes are 
closely inter-related. The first two outcomes characterize the referral behavior, whereas 
the last outcome characterizes the referral outcome. 
                                                 
33 As the treatment in the experiment was framed messages sent by email, a small portion of customers 
(around 7%), who have selected to unsubscribe future email from the company at the time of their previous 
purchase were excluded in the analysis. The exclusion does not affect our results since the involved 
customers are minimal and the randomization is orthogonal to the subscription. 
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3. Empirical Strategy 
To identify the effect of different calls-to-action on senders’ referral behavior and referral 
outcomes, I run regression models at the sender level with and without controls. First, I 
relate the outcome variables to dummy indicators of each of the treatment groups and 
employ linear probability models and ordinary least squares (Equation 5). The main 
estimation equation for sender i is 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           (5) 
where Yi is the outcome variable of the interest (e.g. sender’s decision to share, total 
number of referrals, number of recipient’s purchase that originated from the sender).  
 Additionally, for efficiency purposes and to examine the effects of interesting 
covariates related to customer affinity (i.e. NPS score and past purchase behavior) and 
timing of call-to-action (i.e. elapsed time since last purchase), I augment the field 
experiment data with survey and archival data and employ linear probability models and 
ordinary least squares (Equation 6).  
  
                
       
                                                    (6) 
      
 In the above model, NPSi indicates the reported NPS score of each sender i. The 
collaborating platform conduct surveys to collect NPS score (intention of spreading 
word-of-mouth) of the customer after each purchase. While NPS score is widely adopted 
in practice, there have been only few investigations examining the relationship between 
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NPS score and actual referral behavior (Keiningham, Cooil, Aksoy, Andreassen, and 
Weiner 2007). The data of NPS scores collected prior to the experiment allow me to 
estimate the main effect as well as the moderator effect of NPS score on the referral 
behaviors and outcomes. In the experiment, 23% of the users had reported their NPS 
score prior to the experiment. I also include a survey response dummy variable (e.g. 
Surveyi) as a control, which would account for situations when NPS score information is 
missing.  
 In addition, I measure the recency of a sender’s purchase using 
WeeksSinceLastPurchasei, i.e. the number of weeks that have elapsed between the sender 
i’s last purchase and the day of the experiment. The lower the value of 
WeeksSinceLastPurchasei, the more recent the sender’s last purchase is. As discussed in 
hypothesis 2B, I am interested in the moderator effect of the variable -- how the effect of 
a call for a referral campaign on senders' referral behavior changes over time after the 
purchase. As the timing of the experiment was exogenous to the recency of senders' last 
purchase, the coefficient of WeeksSinceLastPurchasei variable captures this dynamic 
effect. Despite the anecdotal evidence indicating that user’s response to the referral 
campaign changes over time, this dynamic property of response to referral program has 
received less attention in the prior research. Lastly, I also control for sender’s behavior 
prior to the experiment, including purchase characteristics such as number of past 
purchases (e.g. NumPurchasei), amount of money paid (e.g. Spendingi), discount received 
(e.g. Discounti), and daily deal channel used (e.g. DailydealPurchasei) across different 
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product categories k (e.g. Blanket, Photobook, Canvas, and others)34. To further test how 
different customer characteristics moderate the effect of call-to-action, I interact the 
moderating variables with the test group indicator and estimate the model using the 
following specification 
 
 
 
                                                                        (7) 
where Moderating_vari denotes different moderating variables such as sender’s past 
purchase behavior, NPS score, and the recency of sender’s last purchase and where 
Control_vari denotes all the control variables used in equation 6.  
4. Results 
Before reporting the results of the analysis, I compare the differences in customers’ 
characteristics across the four test groups to ensure that the randomization is at work. 
Table 13 demonstrates that the sample is well balanced across all the covariates, 
supporting the validity of the randomization procedure.  
Testgroup 
Sampl
e size 
Total number of past 
purchases 
Total spending 
Week after the last 
purchase 
Using dailydeal 
(DV) 
Response to 
survey(DV) 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
C 
 
9186 1.4402 0.9925 83.2190 120.2924 11.6090 3.3566 0.4526 0.4978 0.2296 0.4206 
T1  
(Egoistic) 
27919 1.4330 0.9742 84.2600 117.6745 11.6880 3.3327 0.4479 0.4973 0.2292 0.4203 
T2 
(Equitable) 
28113 1.4395 1.0300 84.5204 107.2044 11.6934 3.3353 0.4495 0.4975 0.2276 0.4193 
T3 
(Altruistic) 
27929 1.4393 1.4870 84.4201 110.0156 11.6730 3.3371 0.4501 0.4975 0.2321 0.4222 
p value for 
joint test 
 0.8950  0.8042  0.1842  0.8752  0.6428  
Table 13: Randomization check 
 
                                                 
34 Table 31 outline the descriptive statistics of the customers in the study 
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4.1 Main Results 
I first report the main effect of different calls-to-action on the three outcomes of interest 
(customer’s referral decision, total number of referrals and number of recipient’s 
purchase) in Table 14. The results of linear probability model in column (1) show that, 
relative to the control group, only the altruistic framing significantly increases the 
probability of a sender making any referrals. The increase is more than 60% over that of 
the control group. The effect of altruistic framing is also significantly higher than the 
effect of egoistic framing (T3-T1) by 113% and equitable framing (T3-T2) by 29%. 
When examining the effect of call-to-action on the total number of referrals, I find that 
both equitable and altruistic framing significantly increase the total number of referrals 
compared to the control group by 43% and 86%, respectively (Table 14, column (3)). 
Again, the effect of altruistic framing on the total number of referrals is 99% higher than 
the effect of egoistic framing (T3-T1) and 30% higher than the effect of equitable 
framing (T3-T2). Hence, H1A is strongly supported.  
 I further present the effect of different calls-to-action on the referral outcomes in 
Table 14 column (5). I find that altruistic framing leads to significantly larger number of 
recipients’ purchases (by 245%) compared to the control group. A comparison between 
altruistic framing and other framing effects shows that altruistic framing leads to a 
significantly higher number of recipients’ purchases compared to both egoistic framing 
(T3-T1) by 425% and equitable framing (T3-T2) by 135%. All the impacts are 
statistically significant and economically sizable. Therefore, H1B is supported. In 
addition, I find that the conversion rate (= total number of success referrals / total number 
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of referrals) of the altruistic group is 85% higher than the conversion rate of the control 
group, and 164% and 81% higher than the conversion rate of egoistic group and equitable 
group, respectively (Table 15). The results are aligned with the fact that selective sharing 
driven by altruistic considerations (of friends’ payoff) may result in a higher conversion 
rate (Aral et al. 2011) and thus are more effective.  
 
DV Referral decision Total number of referrals 
Number of recipients’ 
purchase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
0.0060*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0108*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0083*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0179***  
(0.0031) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0005)  
T1 (Egoistic)  
-0.0015 
(0.0010) 
-0.0014 
(0.0010) 
-0.0005 
(0.0020) 
-0.0004  
(0.0020) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0002 
(0.0003)  
T2 (Equitable)   
0.0014 
(0.0010) 
0.0015 
(0.0010)  
0.0036* 
(0.0020) 
0.0037* 
(0.0020) 
0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0000 
(0.0003) 
T3 (Altruistic)  
0.0036*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0036*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0072*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
Survey 
- -0.0019  
(0.0030) 
- -0.0061  
(0.0060) 
- -0.0003 
(0.0009)  
NPS 
- 0.0011*** 
(0.0003) 
- 0.0022*** 
(0.0006) 
- 0.0001 
(0.0001) 
WeeksSinceLastPurchase 
- -0.0012*** 
(0.0001)  
- -0.0022*** 
(0.0002) 
- -0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
NumPurchase_Blanket 
- 0.0030*** 
(0.0008) 
- 0.0084*  
(0.0015) 
- 1.28E-05 
(0.0002) 
Spending_Blanket 
- 3.32E-06 
(0.0000) 
- 1.47E-05  
(0.0000) 
- 8.22E-07 
(0.0000) 
Discount_Blanket 
- 0.0071*** 
(0.0016) 
- 0.0056* 
(0.0033) 
- 0.0012** 
(0.0005) 
DailydealPurchase_ 
Blanket 
- -0.0018*** 
(0.0006) 
- -0.0031***  
(0.0011) 
- -0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
NumPurchase_ 
Photobook 
- 0.0104*** 
(0.0019)  
- 0.0159*** 
(0.0037)  
- 0.0016*** 
(0.0006)  
Spending_Photobook 
- -0.0001** 
(0.0000) 
- -0.0001**  
(0.0000) 
- -1.3E-05*  
(0.0000) 
Discount_Photobook 
- 0.0036 
(0.0026) 
- 0.0084  
(0.0053) 
- 0.0004 
(0.0008) 
DailydealPurchase_ 
Photobook 
- -0.0094*** 
(0.0016) 
- -0.0154***  
(0.0032) 
- -0.0015***  
(0.0005) 
NumPurchase_Canvas 
- 0.0016 
(0.0016) 
- 0.0072** 
(0.0032) 
- 5.11E-05  
(0.0005) 
Spending_Canvas 
- -5.3E-05*** 
(0.0000)  
- 3.55E-05 
(0.0000) 
- 9.17E-06** 
(0.0000)  
Discount_Canvas 
- 0.0044* 
(0.0024)  
- 0.0022  
(0.0049) 
- -0.0002 
(0.0008) 
DailydealPurchase_ 
Canvas 
- -0.0024* 
(0.0013) 
- -0.0070***  
(0.0027) 
- -0.0002 
(0.0004) 
NumPurchase_Others 
- 0.0026*** 
(0.0006)  
- 0.0029**  
(0.0012) 
- 0.0009*** 
(0.0002) 
Spending_Others 
- -1.9E-06 
(0.0000)  
- 2.8E-06  
(0.0000) 
- -1.4E-06 
(0.0000) 
Discount_Others 
- 0.0083*** 
(0.0014) 
- 0.0142*** 
(0.0029 )  
- 6.4E-05 
(0.0004)  
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DailydealPurchase_ 
Others 
- -0.0030*** 
(0.0006)  
- -0.0037*** 
(0.0012) 
- -0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
       
p-value (T3 – T1) <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0028 0.0028  
p-value (T3 – T2) 0.0026 0.0029  0.0123 0.0138  0.0338 0.0325  
       
Observations 93147 93147 93147 93147 93147 93147 
R-squared 0.0006 0.008 0.0004 0.0067 0.0001 0.0013 
Table 14: Main Effect 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses.  
 
Testgroup Conversion rate (%) 
Control 2.632 
T1 (Egoistic) 1.852 
T2 (Equitable) 2.695 
T3 (Altruistic) 4.884 
Table 15 : Conversion Rate of Each Group 
Note: Conversion rate (= total number of success referrals / total number of referrals) 
 
 I also report the results of the impact of control variables in Table 14 (Column 2, 
4, 6). In addition to the main effects, I control for senders’ NPS score, senders’ past 
purchase behavior across different product types, as well as the recency of senders’ 
purchase, as measured by elapsed time between the call for referral and senders’ last 
purchase. As shown in the table, the coefficient of NPS score is significantly positive 
with regard to referral behavior, i.e. customers with high NPS score are significantly 
more likely to respond to the campaign and make referrals. This effect is consistent with 
previous literature (Keiningham et al. 2007). Similarly, the coefficient of 
WeeksSinceLastPurchasei, elapsed time between senders’ last purchase and the referral 
campaign, is significantly negative with regard to all the outcome variables. As the 
treatment assignment was exogenous to the recency of senders' last purchase, the variable 
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captures how the effect of call for referral campaign on senders' referral behavior and 
outcomes decrease over time after their last purchase. The result suggests that the best 
time for firms to engage customers with a call for referral is immediately after customers’ 
purchases. Finally, I estimate the model using alternative specifications to ensure the 
results are robust. As can be seen in Appendix D Table 32, I find that the results are 
consistent across binary outcome models (probit and logit models) and count models 
(Poisson and Negative Binomial models). 
 In summary, I find that framing the same incentive scheme differently can 
significantly affect the effect of call-to-action on customers’ referral behaviors and 
outcomes. I find that the altruistic call-to-action is most effective in driving referral 
behavior (likelihood of making referrals and the total number of referrals), and results in 
the best referral outcomes. Moreover, while egoistic framing and equitable framing are 
widely adopted practice, I find the effect of altruistic framing is significantly higher than 
the effect of those two types of calls-to-action. Such finding is provocative for both 
theory and practice. It implies that firms should adopt the altruistic framing in their call-
to-action. And it also indicates that altruism may play an important role in online 
referrals. 
4.2 Testing the Role of Altruism using Moderator Effects 
Having identified the effectiveness of altruistic framing in driving referrals, I further 
examine the role of altruism through a variety of moderator effect analysis. Specifically, I 
test whether the effect of altruistic framing varies based on customer characteristics and 
the timing of the call-to-action, as articulated in Hypothesis 2A and 2B. As I posit, I 
 72 
 
should see the higher impact of altruistic framing for customers with high affinity of the 
product, as customers will care more about their friend’s utility and in this case, 
customers will project their own evaluation onto others (Cronbach, 1955; Ichheiser, 
1946). For a similar reason, if altruism is an important driver of online referrals, I should 
expect the effect of altruistic framing on referral behavior may decrease fast over time as 
such referral behavior is relying on customers' intrinsic delight/altruism about the 
product, which may decay over time after their purchase.  
 I represent customers’ affinity with the product by measuring their degree of 
repeat purchases (Hoyer, 1984) and by their reported NPS score (Reichheld 1996). 
Therefore, I examine the moderating effects of repeat purchases and NPS score on the 
treatment effect of different calls-to-action. Using archival data on individual purchase 
history on the platform, I construct a binary indicator RepeatPurchasesi which indicates 
whether a sender made more than two purchases in the past, and interact the variable with 
the treatment group indicator as specified in Equation 7. I report the results in Table 16. I 
find that the effect of altruistic framing on referral behavior is significantly higher for 
customers who made repeat purchases. Using the same specification, I examine the 
moderating effect of NPS score (Table 17) and find that the reported NPS score of a 
customer positively moderates the effect of altruistic framing on their referral behavior. 
Customers with a high NPS score are significantly (~73%) more likely to share when 
they are targeted with an altruistic framing call-to-action. Overall, the results support 
H2A and are aligned with the theorizing that altruism plays an important role in driving 
referrals. 
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DV 
Total number of 
referrals 
RepeatPurchases 
-0.0139*** 
(0.0041) 
RepeatPurchases * 
T1(Egoistic) 
0.0051 
(0.0045) 
RepeatPurchases * 
T2(Equitable) 
0.0062 
(0.0045) 
RepeatPurchases * 
T3(Altruistic) 
0.0102** 
(0.0045) 
Table 16: Moderating Effects of Repeat Purchases 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. A full set of controls has been applied. Variable ‘RepeatPurchases’ indicates 
whether a user purchased a product more than twice in the past 
 
DV 
Total number of 
referrals 
NPS 
0.0017** 
(0.0008) 
NPS * T1(Egoistic) 
0.0002 
(0.0005) 
NPS * T2(Equitable) 
0.0003 
(0.0005) 
NPS * T3(Altruistic) 
0.0013** 
(0.0005) 
Table 17: Moderating Effects of NPS Score 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. A full set of controls has been applied. 
 
 I further explore the role of timing of call-to-action in moderating the treatment 
effect. As mentioned earlier, I expect that the effect of altruistic framing on referral 
behavior may decrease as more time passes between the customers’ last purchase and the 
call-to-action. This would be consistent with decay in enthusiasm or delight after 
purchasing the product. I present the moderating effect of the recency of customer’s 
purchase in Table 18. I find that the effect of referral campaign on customers' referral 
behavior decreases over time (the coefficient of “WeeksSinceLastPurchase” is negative). 
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More interestingly and consistent with my theoretical prediction, I find that the recency 
of customers’ purchases positively moderates the effect of altruistic framing on the 
number of referrals. This result supports H2B and helps further triangulate the main story 
that centers on the fact that the altruistic framing activates users with high product 
affinity which may lead to more effective referrals. Practically speaking, the analysis 
suggests that firms should target high affinity customers first in their referral campaigns, 
and that the best time to initiate call-to-action is immediately after purchase, when 
customers are most enthusiastic about the product.  
 
DV 
Total number of 
referrals 
WeeksSinceLastPurchase 
-0.0018*** 
(0.0005) 
WeeksSinceLastPurchase 
* T1(Egoistic) 
0.0006 
(0.0006) 
WeeksSinceLastPurchase 
* T2(Equitable) 
-0.0007 
(0.0006) 
WeeksSinceLastPurchase 
* T3(Altruistic) 
-0.0012** 
(0.0006) 
Table 18: Moderating Effects of Timing 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. A full set of controls has been applied. Variable ‘WeeksSinceLastPurchase’ 
indicates the recency of a sender’s purchase, as measured by the number of weeks that have 
elapsed between the sender’s last purchase and the day of the experiment. Therefore, the lower 
the value, the more recent the sender’s last purchase is. Negative sign of ‘WeeksSince 
LastPurchase’ indicates positive moderating effect of the recency of a sender’s purchase 
 
4.3 Post-experiment Survey on Referral Motives 
To further investigate the underlying mechanisms explaining the main result, I conducted 
a post-experiment survey designed to shed light on customers’ motives for sharing or not-
sharing the referrals. The survey was administered three weeks after the experiment to all 
the 100,000 customers in the experiment, including those who shared and didn’t share. 
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Figure 10 describes the survey sent to each customer (with the questions and choices). 
The survey allows me to perform a direct test of Hypothesis 3. In addition, the survey 
helps me conduct a manipulation check, namely, whether a given framing (e.g. 
emphasizing altruism) provokes customers with the corresponding motive (e.g. altruism). 
It permits me to measure the impact of different framing on customers’ motive to share or 
not to share, and to understand how different motives connect to customers’ referral 
decisions and the outcomes. 
 
Figure 10. Questionnaire in the Survey 
 When analyzing the survey responses35, I find significant differences across the 
treatment groups as shown in Figure 11 and 12. The left panel in Figure 11 shows the 
response to the question: “I feel guilty or uneasy about using referral incentive 
programs”. Compared to control group and egoistic group, I find that the portion of the 
customers reporting guilt as the reason they didn’t share is significantly smaller in the 
altruistic group. The results show that altruistic framing reduces sender’s guilt from 
getting a reward for the referral. The results from the survey together with the empirical 
                                                 
35 The survey had 785 valid questionnaires returned, representing a response rate of 0.8% 
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findings suggest that guilt may be an important motive for customers not to share. 
Therefore, when designing the referral program, firms may benefit from using the 
altruistic framing to reduce the feeling of guilt in customers in order to increase their 
referrals.  
 
Figure 11: Response of Motives Not to Share 
 The right panel in Figure 11 (responses of users who did not share) shows the 
response to the question: “I cannot think of a friend or family member who might like 
collage products”. On one hand, I hypothesized that altruistic framing enhance senders’ 
care for their friends and thus, make it harder for them to find potential recipients. 
However, Figure 11 indicates that altruistic framing doesn’t increase the difficulty for the 
sender to identify a potential recipient compared to control group. Interestingly, when 
compared to those who receive egoistic framing, the customers who receive altruistic 
framing are significantly more likely to report “higher difficulty” in identifying friends or 
family as the recipient. The contrast reflects how different framing primes the customers 
to think differently: egoistic framing enhances sender’s focus on one’s own benefits, 
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while altruistic framing does the opposite, putting the senders’ focus who else would 
benefit the most. 
 
Figure 12: Responses of Motives to Share 
 Next, Figure 12 displays treatment effect differences observed in users who chose 
to share the online referral. The left panel exhibits the response to the question: “I am 
happy with the promotion (70% discount) that I get when making referral(s)”. Aligned 
with the above argument, the figure shows that compared to the control group and the 
altruistic group, more customers in the egoistic group and equitable group shared because 
of the reward for themselves. The right-panel in Figure 12 shows the response to the 
question: “I have family/friend(s) who might be happy with the promotion (70% 
discount).” The figure shows that compared to the control group, a significantly larger 
number of senders in the altruistic group made referrals because of their care about 
others’ benefits. The two panels in Figure 12 show that different ways of framing 
messages impacts the different motives of senders to share. Customers are more likely to 
report motive (e.g. altruism) that corresponds to the framing they received (e.g. altruistic 
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framing). In addition, the results provide further evidence that customers who received 
altruistic framing care more about their friends’ utility, and are thus able to generate more 
effective referrals, which in turn, explains the highest conversion rate of altruistic framing 
across all test groups. 
 Overall, the results from the survey support H3 as well as allow me to look into 
the effect of different framing on referral behaviors and outcomes. Firstly, I establish that 
a significant difference in customers’ motive consistent with the treatment confirms that 
the manipulation was successful. Secondly, the survey results align nicely to explain the 
impact of different framing with regards to its effect on different customers’ motives. The 
results show that altruistic framing reduces senders’ guilt and enhances altruism; whereas 
egoistic framing enhances concern about one’s own welfare but doesn’t reduce guilt. 
Finally, the results show how altruistic framing positively affects both referral decisions 
and the subsequent outcomes through different mechanisms. On the one hand, altruistic 
framing increases senders’ probability to share by reducing their guilt from getting 
referral rewards. On the other hand, altruistic framing improves referral outcomes by 
enhancing the altruistic feeling and by encouraging selective and better-targeted referrals. 
5. Discussion 
In this essay, I design and conduct a randomized field experiment that allows me to 
examine this question and make causal inference. Specifically, I collaborate with an e-
commerce platform and target 100,000 customers in different groups with emails that 
only vary in their call-to-action for initiating the referral process. The design allows me to 
reduce the risk of various challenges of experimental analysis such as: the validity of the 
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randomization procedure, the likelihood of interference and the possibility of selection 
bias across groups. I find that the altruistic framing of the call-to-action is most effective 
in driving more referrals and better outcomes. 
 The findings have both theoretical and practical implications that are linked to my 
hypotheses. First, this is the first study to show that altruism is an important driver 
underlying the success of online referrals. I find that altruistic framing positively affects 
both referral decision and outcomes through multiple mechanisms. Specifically, altruistic 
framing can improve the referral process by reducing senders’ guilt from getting referral 
rewards and by encouraging better targeting by senders which may lead to higher 
conversion rate. The results together provide concrete and causal support to the hitherto 
under-studied role of altruism in creating social contagion. This essay is also among the 
first to provide comprehensive (direct and indirect) evidence on the underlying motives 
that drive or discourage senders’ online word-of-mouth. Such insights on the motives of 
people who chose to refer others to products or services may serve as guiding principles 
for firms that wish to encourage word-of-mouth. 
 Additionally, this essay also closes the gap in the literature around the optimal 
design of referral programs. While previous research has investigated the design of the 
message from sender to the recipients (Sun et al. 2014), no study has investigated how 
firms can optimally design the call-to-action to engage customers in initiating referrals in 
the first place. I contribute to the literature by examining how firms can optimally frame a 
call-to-action, keeping every other aspect, namely the incentive split and the recipients’ 
message, constant across treatments. The results show that altruistic call-to-action for 
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referral leads to higher likelihood of referral and better referral outcomes. In addition, the 
effect of altruistic framing is significantly higher than the effect of egoistic framing and 
equitable framing for a variety of the sharing outcomes. Therefore, companies which seek 
to maximize returns from their referral programs should use altruistic framing in their 
call-to-action for referral. In addition, I find that this altruistic framing is more effective 
for users who have made repeat purchases, for those who reported a higher NPS score 
and for those just purchased. Thus, firm should target loyal customers soon after their 
purchases in the referral campaigns. 
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Conclusion 
 
Firms increasingly rely on digital word-of-mouth to increase their customer base and 
product sales. Given the existing knowledge on the effect of message design, it is 
important to understand the effect of different incentive and calls-to-action design on 
customers’ referral behavior and outcome. In my dissertation, I examine whether and 
how a firm can enhance the effectiveness of a referral program by varying incentives and 
messages shared by customers with their friends using two large-scale randomized field 
experiments. In the first essay, I found that that the generous pro-social referral reward 
schemes dominate purely selfish schemes in creating word-of-mouth. In the second 
essay, I show that 'altruistic' call for referral is most effective in driving sharing behavior 
and result in better sharing outcomes. All the results together provide direct managerial 
implications for firms to optimally design the referral program and support that altruism 
plays an important role in referral behavior. 
 This dissertation complements three streams of prior research at the intersection 
of information systems and marketing: estimating causal peer influence in social 
networks, constructing optimal referral design to promote WOM based adoption, and 
exploring the underlying motives of referral behavior. Although previous studies using 
randomization trials have demonstrated peer influence at work (Aral and Walker 2011b, 
Bapna and Umyarov 2016), there hasn’t been much empirical investigation to discover 
how different referral incentive schemes and call-to-action drive the peer influence in the 
social contagion process. Existing studies of designing referral programs on WOM 
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mainly focused on senders’ behavior and rarely considered incentive sharing schemes or 
different message design (Kornish and Li 2010, Wirtz and Chew 2002, Ryu and Feick 
2007). I contribute to the literature by studying how firms can optimally design the 
incentive and message to the sender (call-to-action) to engage customers. Finally, my 
study is also among the first to show that altruism is an important driver of information 
sharing among customers and how such motive leads to sharing decision and sharing 
outcomes (Dunn and Norton 2013, Bitzer et al. 2007, Anderson and Agarwal 2011, Jabr 
et al. 2014, Xia, et al. 2012). 
 This dissertation also provides several opportunities for further research. In the 
first essay, one aspect that this trial was not aimed to uncover was the exact psychological 
reasons behind the user’s referral behavior, but to study which of the referral incentive 
scheme works best for maximizing word-of-mouth based adoption. However, results, 
especially from Study 1, showing the efficacy of the generous scheme hint at the possible 
role of happiness from pro-social behavior in creating diffusion in social networks. 
Similarly, the failure of the selfish reward scheme hint at the potential role of guilt felt by 
users in benefitting from inviting their friends. Studying these exact psychological 
motivations of users may be considered in future works, which would require designing a 
different set of experiments in which the incentives only influence one possible 
motivation at a time while controlling for all the others. 
Additionally, given that I observed differences between the referral behavior of 
the existing and the new users in the trial, I expect future research to examine whether the 
referral reward structure offered to a user needs to evolve over time. This begs several 
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questions: (i) How should firms dynamically adapt the design of the referral incentive 
scheme to maximize adoption (e.g., optimally switch over from selfish or split reward 
scheme to a generous reward scheme based on how long a user has been using the 
product)? (ii) Does this behavior hold more generally for contexts beyond those 
considered in this paper?  
 Regarding the second essay, a logical next step is for researchers to examine the 
integration of two different types of widely used calls-to-action., namely call for referral 
and call for purchase. Specifically, customers may play two roles in their lifecycle: 
purchaser and influencer, and firms may engage customers with either call for referral or 
call for purchase at different points in time. However, there is a fundamental tradeoff 
between the two calls due to the limited attention of customers. Similar to a call for 
purchase, a call for referral is usually sent out to customers in the form of digital 
marketing communication, e.g. through electronic email and mobile messages. Given the 
limited bandwidth of marketing communication, it is important and interesting to 
compare call for referral with call for purchase, especially promotional advertising, which 
is the dominant form of marketing communication from a firm. Based on the results from 
the experiment, I identify three types of differences between the two forms of 
communication. First, for durable goods like printed products I studied in this paper, calls 
for purchase are, in general, not effective immediately after purchase. However, the 
results provide evidence that this may be the best time to engage customers with referral 
marketing. Second, promotional email is more effective when targeted to less loyal 
customers in calls for purchase. However, in calls for referral, promotional email 
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highlighting the reward to a friend is most effective for loyal customers because of 
altruism. Finally, while calls for purchase are always highlighting customer’s own 
benefits, the optimal design for calls for referral should highlight the benefits for their 
friends. Interestingly, all the three differences, the timing, the targeting and the design 
make an altruistic call-to-action for referral complementary with the call for purchase in 
marketing communication. Thus firms can optimally combine them to form an integrated 
communication strategy and engage customers throughout their lifecycle. Although both 
marketing communications are widely used in practice, there have been no empirical tests 
comparing performance of these two calls-to-action when they are used together. I expect 
future studies to deepen our understanding by providing guidelines how firms can 
optimally integrate these two calls-to-action. 
 In addition, in the second essay, I test the importance of altruism by varying the 
framing of call-to-action for the same equal-split incentive scheme. Thus, even under the 
altruistic framing, the sender may still gain monetary reward from making referral 
rewards. Given the good performance of altruistic framing, it might be interesting for 
future research to determine whether altruism is strong enough to make the reward to the 
sender redundant. In other words, will the sender still be willing to make referrals even 
without reward to herself? 
 Understanding which type of incentive scheme and call for referral are most 
effective in creating social contagion through word-of-mouth is a crucial step in 
developing optimal referral marketing strategies. I believe that my dissertation, through 
two large-scale randomized field experiments, can contribute to the rich literature in IS 
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and marketing on word-of-mouth and social contagion by providing insights on the effect 
and mechanisms of different incentive structure and calls-to-action for WOM referrals. 
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Appendix A 
Variable Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.0034 0.0145 -0.23 0.8161 
T0 0.0013 0.0018 0.72 0.4708 
T1  0.0010 0.0018 0.57 0.5716 
T2 0.0035 0.0018 1.94 0.052 
T3 0.0077 0.0018 4.37 <.0001 
Game_count_(t-1) -0.0162 0.0015 -11.2 <.0001 
Table 19. Effect of Incentive Schemes on Number of Invites with Lagged Game Count  
 
Variable Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.0003 0.0121 -0.02 0.9807 
T0 0.0014 0.0015 0.91 0.3638 
T1  -0.0008 0.0015 -0.55 0.5807 
T2 0.0025 0.0015 1.67 0.0949 
T3 0.0034 0.0015 2.3 0.0215 
Game_total_player 0.0414 0.0003 123.88 <.0001 
Table 20. Effect of Incentive Schemes on Number of Invites with Total Number of Players 
in a game  
Variable Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.0031 0.0145 -0.21 0.831 
T0 0.0039 0.0045 0.87 0.3848 
T1 0.0077 0.0048 1.6 0.1104 
T2 0.0067 0.0049 1.38 0.1665 
T3 0.0167 0.0044 3.8 0.0001 
T0*NewUser 0.0012 0.0019 0.63 0.5299 
T1*NewUser 0.0004 0.0019 0.23 0.8184 
T2*NewUser 0.0033 0.0019 1.75 0.0796 
T3*NewUser 0.0066 0.0019 3.55 0.0004 
Game_count_(t-1) -0.0163 0.0015 -11.24 <.0001 
Table 21. Effect of Incentive Schemes on Number of Invites for New and Existing Users 
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Variable Group Est. SE 
t-value 
(C vs. T) 
p-value F-value Pr>F 
login_days 
C 2.4706 0.7332   1.44 0.2233 
T0 1.9286 0.2490 0.89 0.3746   
T1 1.6765 0.1726 1.40 0.1690   
T2 1.8611 0.2647 0.97 0.3387   
T3 2.5789 0.3931 -0.14 0.8878   
login_hours 
C 3.4118 1.2219   2.11 0.0822 
T0 2.6667 0.4279 0.73 0.4692   
T1 2.2941 0.3469 1.13 0.2631   
T2 2.7500 0.4918 0.60 0.5496   
T3 4.3421 0.7129 -0.69 0.4911   
game_count 
C 0.5882 0.3436   0.7 0.5962 
T0 1.4048 0.6791 -0.75 0.4587   
T1 0.9706 0.5196 -0.49 0.6248   
T2 0.8056 0.3305 -0.40 0.6873   
T3 1.9474 0.8053 -1.10 0.2747   
game_total_player 
C 2.6471 1.4974   0.6 0.6603 
T0 4.9286 2.3940 -0.59 0.5606   
T1 3.3235 1.6524 -0.26 0.7936   
T2 3.0556 1.2755 -0.19 0.8483   
T3 6.6316 2.5372 -1.01 0.3164   
game_ave_player 
C 4.7000 0.7000   0.29 0.8834 
T0 3.3981 0.1628 2.74 0.0227   
T1 3.8750 0.4820 0.98 0.3594   
T2 3.7270 0.4027 1.28 0.2373   
T3 3.7583 0.3576 1.25 0.2379   
game_total_time 
C 281.3 154.3   0.38 0.8197 
T0 502.7 245.5 -0.55 0.5819   
T1 362.6 164.9 -0.32 0.7541   
T2 325.8 130.0 -0.21 0.8384   
T3 578.6 195.9 -0.95 0.3444   
game_ave_time 
C 528.9 101.6   0.2 0.9404 
T0 360.1 60.3843 1.45 0.1809   
T1 464.2 126.5 0.33 0.7518   
T2 438.1 59.5475 0.81 0.4408   
T3 402.1 72.1363 0.88 0.3988   
location_count 
C 1.2941 0.2539   1.7 0.1533 
T0 1.1905 0.1240 0.41 0.6831   
T1 1.0294 0.1367 1.01 0.3197   
T2 1.2222 0.1443 0.26 0.7930   
T3 1.5789 0.1946 -0.84 0.4021   
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Adoption_count 
C 0.1176 0.1176   0.23 0.9201 
T0 0.1429 0.0874 -0.16 0.8726   
T1 0.1765 0.1299 -0.29 0.7723   
T2 0.0556 0.0387 0.63 0.5291   
T3 0.1842 0.1404 -0.30 0.7684   
app_update_date 
C 10.9412 2.4933   1.71 0.1497 
T0 12.0238 1.9250 -0.32 0.7528   
T1 10.5000 2.1120 0.13 0.8994   
T2 14.3611 2.3167 -0.90 0.3709   
T3 6.7632 1.4994 1.50 0.1404   
Join_time_duration 
C 61.7622 2.0697   0.44 0.7806 
T0 60.0292 1.2203 0.58 0.4448   
T1 59.3829 1.0777 1.27 0.2604   
T2 59.1250 1.2404 1.32 0.2505   
T3 59.6310 1.1742 0.92 0.3383   
Table 22 Pairwise Comparison of the Pre-treatment Behavior across Control and 
Treatment for Existing Users 
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Appendix B 
As user’s attachment and usage of the product and mechanisms that govern contagion 
processes in networks changes over time (Aral et al. 2009, Aral and Walker 2011b), I 
therefore expect that the effect of incentive scheme on sender’s behavior would also 
change over time. If so, understanding the factors that influence the sender’s behavior 
over time is an important component of the design of successful referral programs. 
Therefore, I conduct a secondary analysis to understand the underlying mechanisms of 
the observed effects. Specifically, I examined heterogeneity in the treatment effect 
around the time the user joined the site. Table 23 outlines the statistics of user activity 
during the experiment period with t-tests for the statistical significance of differences 
between the existing users (users who joined the site before the treatment) and new users 
(users who joined the site during the treatment) 36.  
Existing 
user* 
Variable Est. SE t-value p-value 
0 login_days 1.2190 0.0148 0.09 0.9308 
1 login_days 1.2143 0.0948   
0 login_hours 1.5013 0.0341 -1.98 0.0482 
1 login_hours 1.7440 0.2019   
0 game_count 0.1760 0.0371 -2.47 0.0136 
1 game_count 0.4702 0.1223   
0 game_total_player 0.6232 0.1297 -2.97 0.0030 
1 game_total_player 1.8631 0.4359   
0 game_ave_player 3.5241 0.0817 -3.68 0.0004 
1 game_ave_player 4.2212 0.2217   
                                                 
36 The new and existing users are not significantly different in terms of their login_days (number of days a 
user logged into the game) and location_count (number of unique locations a user played at), which 
suggests that the differences may not driven by demographic factors or intrinsic user characteristics 
(location, availability, interest), but because of differences in invitation behavior and resulting game 
engagements. Hence, I study the heterogeneous effects of incentive schemes with respect to the experience 
of the user, measured in terms of the duration over which the user has been using the application. 
 94 
 
0 game_total_time 61.6173 12.9886 -3.52 0.0004 
1 game_total_time 209.8 46.2597   
0 game_ave_time 382.6 30.6265 -2.53 0.0131 
1 game_ave_time 536.7 56.7104   
0 location_count 0.9583 0.0137 0.99 0.3243 
1 location_count 0.9107 0.0750   
0 adoption_count 0.0385 0.00705 -2.90 0.0038 
1 adoption_count 0.1071 0.0316   
0 join_time_duration 54.1545 0.3071 -42.82 <.0001 
1 join_time_duration 111.2 2.8936   
Table 23 Summary Statistics of the Behavior across Existing and New Users 
*Note: 1 denotes the group of organic existing user, 0 denotes organic new users 
 
As demonstrated in Table 24, results from this analysis show that there are heterogeneous 
effects of incentive schemes on referrals with respect to the type of the user. Results of 
the two-way fixed effects model show that the generous reward increases the number of 
invited adoptions for both new and existing users, but the treatment effect is higher for 
new users.  
 
Variable Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept -0.00306 0.0145 -0.21 0.8330 
T0 0.003352 0.00445 0.75 0.4518 
T1 0.007402 0.00481 1.54 0.1238 
T2 0.006498 0.00485 1.34 0.1807 
T3 0.0154*** 0.00441 3.51 0.0005 
T0*NewUser 0.0012 0.00194 0.63 0.5298 
T1*NewUser 0.0003 0.00190 0.18 0.8561 
T2*NewUser 0.0031 0.00189 1.66 0.0979 
T3*NewUser 0.0061*** 0.00185 3.32 0.0009 
Table 24. Effect of Incentive Schemes on Number of Invites for New and Existing Users 
These results together confirm the main findings of the study: different incentive 
schemes have different effectiveness in promoting offline WOM-based adoption 
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depending on the whether the users are new comers or existing users of the product. 
Additionally, I found that in this context the generous reward schemes dominates 
especially for new users.  
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Appendix C 
 
OLS DV: invite_num_sent 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1.2307 0.6355 1.94 0.0556 
T1 (Selfish) 1.9615 0.8988 2.18 0.0314 
T2 (Split) 0.8077 0.8988 0.9 0.371 
T3 (Generous) 0.9692 0.9077 1.07 0.2882 
Table 25. Effect of Incentive Schemes on the Number of Referrals 
 
OLS DV: invite_num_converted 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.2692 0.3313 0.81 0.418 
T1 (Selfish) 0.8461 0.4685 1.81 0.074 
T2 (Split) 0.8846 0.4685 1.89 0.062 
T3 (Generous) 0.8908 0.4732 1.88 0.063 
Table 26. Effect of Incentive Schemes on the Number of Adoptions 
 
 
Poisson DV: Invite_num_sent 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept 0.6775 0.1381 24.09 <.0001 
T1 (Selfish) 0.4399 0.169 6.77 0.0093 
T2 (Split) -0.0186 0.1891 0.01 0.9217 
T3 (Generous) 0.1892 0.1794 1.11 0.2915 
Table 27. Effect of Incentive Schemes on the Number of Referrals (Poisson) 
 
 
Poisson DV: Invite_num_converted 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept -1.3122 0.378 12.05 0.0005 
T1 (Selfish) 1.4214 0.4211 11.39 0.0007 
T2 (Split) 1.4553 0.4197 12.02 0.0005 
T3 (Generous) 1.4606 0.4211 12.03 0.0005 
Table 28. Effect of Incentive Schemes on the Number of Adoptions (Poisson) 
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Linear probability 
model 
DV: Decision_to_adopt 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
Z Pr > |Z| 
Intercept 0.235 0.0766 3.07 0.0022 
Group 1 (Selfish) 0.0996 0.0911 1.09 0.2739 
Group 2 (Split) 0.2568 0.1099 2.34 0.0195 
Group 3 (Generous) 0.1908 0.1128 1.69 0.0706 
 Clustered errors at sender level 
Table 29. Effect of Incentive Schemes on the Referral Acceptance 
 
 
Logit DV: Decision_to_adopt 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
Z Pr > |Z| 
Intercept -1.1801 0.426 -2.77 0.0056 
T1 (Selfish) 0.4929 0.48 1.03 0.3045 
T2 (Split) 1.1474 0.53 2.16 0.0304 
T3 (Generous) 0.8813 0.5441 1.62 0.0853 
 
Probit DV: Decision_to_adopt 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
Z Pr > |Z| 
Intercept -0.7224 0.2492 -2.9 0.0038 
T1 (Selfish) 0.2953 0.2836 1.04 0.2977 
T2 (Split) 0.7019 0.3181 2.21 0.0273 
T3 (Generous) 0.5354 0.3266 1.64 0.0912 
Table 30 Effect of Incentive Schemes on the Referral Acceptance (Logit/Probit) 
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Appendix D 
Variable Mean Median Std Error Std Dev 
LastPurchaseWeek 11.6773 11.6773 0.0109 3.3372 
survey 0.2296 0.0000 0.0014 0.4206 
NPS 9.1915 10.0000 0.0122 1.7853 
NumPurchase_Blanket 0.7011 1.0000 0.0027 0.8328 
Spending_Blanket 48.5692 37.9800 0.2325 70.9464 
Discount_Blanket 0.3318 0.4972 0.0010 0.3138 
DailydealPurchase_ 
Blanket 
0.2743 0.0000 0.0020 0.6173 
NumPurchase_ 
Photobook 
0.1074 0.0000 0.0015 0.4496 
Spending_Photobook 3.0357 0.0000 0.0543 16.5807 
Discount_Photobook 0.0494 0.0000 0.0006 0.1757 
DailydealPurchase_ 
Photobook 
0.0765 0.0000 0.0013 0.3920 
NumPurchase_Canvas 0.1518 0.0000 0.0016 0.4881 
Spending_Canvas 7.4883 0.0000 0.1091 33.3022 
Discount_Canvas 0.0768 0.0000 0.0007 0.2164 
DailydealPurchase_ 
Canvas 
0.0991 0.0000 0.0013 0.4049 
NumPurchase_Others 0.4773 0.0000 0.0034 1.0302 
Spending_Others 25.1908 0.0000 0.2548 77.7624 
Discount_Others 0.1922 0.0000 0.0010 0.2929 
DailydealPurchase_ 
Others 
0.1744 0.0000 0.0025 0.7651 
Table 31. Descriptive Statistics of User Activity 
 
DV Referral decision Total number of referrals 
Number of recipients’ 
purchase 
 Logit Probit Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial 
Poisson 
Negative 
Binomial 
Intercept 
-5.0128*** 
(0.0467) 
-2.4764*** 
(0.0164) 
-4.7947*** 
(0.1147) 
-4.7947*** 
(0.1616) 
-8.4323 
(0.7071) 
-8.4323 
(0.7672) 
T1 (Egoistic)  
-0.3915*** 
(0.0787) 
-0.1374*** 
(0.0271) 
-0.0671 
(0.0020) 
-0.0671 
(0.1872) 
-0.4185 
(0.866) 
-0.4185 
(0.9315) 
T2 (Equitable)   
0.1186* 
(0.0678) 
0.0408* 
(0.0241)  
0.3619*** 
(0.1271) 
0.3619** 
(0.1826) 
0.3855 
(0.7817) 
0.3855 
(0.8536) 
T3 (Altruistic)  
0.3722*** 
(0.0638) 
0.1332*** 
(0.023) 
0.6211*** 
(0.1244) 
0.6211*** 
(0.1809) 
1.2394* 
(0.74) 
1.2394* 
(0.8157) 
Table 32. Treatment Effect under Alternative Specifications 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses.  
 
